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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES 
 
 
 
Tax increment financing (TIF) policy is the most popular economic development 
policy in the United States. Despite the popularity of research on TIF, only a few 
comprehensive reviews of previous studies on TIF policy tool have been conducted. In 
light of this, the purpose of this paper is to review previous TIF studies relating to the 
controversy surrounding TIF programs. Specifically, previous studies do not provide clear 
answers about the efficacy of TIF and, indeed, raise more questions than answers. At the 
same time, this situation begs the question: why do local governments frequently use 
economic development policies? This is the most urgent task in the economic development 
academic area because previous studies have not answered that question in detail.  To 
analyze the effects of competition and the forms of government on the utilization of 
business incentives at the local government level, this study focuses on two major 
incentives: tax credit and tax increment financing. The statistical results show that the 
competition mechanisms operate differently for each of the incentives. More specifically, 
the council-manager system considerably constrains the overall adoption and extent of use 
of business incentives. These results could indicate the prevalence of a particular form of 
government for economic development policies. To determine why local governments 
often use tax-based incentives, this study focuses on five major tax-based incentives: job 
creation tax credits, investment tax credits, R&D credits, property tax abatements, and 
customized job training subsidies. The statistical results indicate that a state government’s 
prevailing political ideology influences the choice of economic development activities. 
Accordingly, a more liberal state may be more likely to discourage property tax abatements 
and customized job-training subsidies and encourage job creation tax credits. Additionally, 
the competition mechanism does not operate as a trigger for tax-based incentives. This 
study also finds that state economic conditions are inversely related to the use of incentives. 
This result could imply the prevalence of political factors in the use of incentives. Clear 
evidence about the effectiveness of economic development incentives is limited. To bridge 
this research gap, this study uses the Upjohn Institute Panel Database on Incentives and 
Taxes (PDIT). Unemployment and employment rates are used to analyze the effectiveness 
of tax-based incentives. Statistical results indicate that tax incentives have a marginal 
impact on employment status and limited benefits to states. Only the R&D tax credit 
statistically significantly increases employment rates. This result supports the 
interpretation of economic development policies as a zero-sum game  
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CHAPTER 1.  AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY: TAX INCREMENTAL 
FINANCING.                
1.1 Introduction  
Confronted with a high unemployment rate, state and local governments have 
experienced double torture (Wu, 2012), with the resulting crisis locking local 
governments in a vicious cycle. Specifically, high unemployment leads to significant 
reductions in local government revenues and requires government to spend more 
resources and operate more programs. Statistical indicators support this serious situation. 
Not only have 27 metropolitan areas among 45 in the Northeast already faced “chronic 
distress,” `but also 33 Midwest metropolitan areas have experienced a similar fate since 
the 1970s (Porter, 2018). Thus, state governments are actively operating local 
development policies that are aimed at increasing local tax bases and jobs. The extent and 
type of economic development policies varies depending on each state (Wang, 2018).  
Substantial attention and interest have existed in the academic field due to the 
dramatic spread of economic development policies, with the majority of studies analyzing 
the effect of such policies at the local level (Betz, Partridge, Kraybill, & Lobao, 2012). 
As more studies are conducted, academic disputes continue about the effect of economic 
development policies. A few studies suggest that there is a positive relationship between 
economic outcomes and economic development policies (Peters & Fisher, 2002; 
Rodriguez-Poase & Arbix, 2001). Many previous studies have made counterarguments 
concerning the positive effects of economic development policies. Some argue that a 
possibility exists that incentive policies could have a negative impact on local areas 
because of the evils of competition (Ellis & Rogers, 2000; Patrick, 2014). Others argue 
that this severe competition could lead to the under-provision of public goods because 
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economic development policies simply relocate businesses (Bartik, 1991; Fisher & 
Peters, 1997; Gorin, 2008; Wang, 2016). Furthermore, Burstein and Rolnick (1995) 
suggest that targeting incentives for a specific industry could cause losses in the national 
economy. We can confirm that the results of economic development policies are mixed. 
Surprisingly, few studies analyze why local governments continue to engage in economic 
development policies even though supporting evidence is lacking.  
The most widely used policies are diverse subsidies and incentives including 
industrial parks and tax abatement (Betz et al., 2012). One of the most popular of many 
economic development policies that local governments offer is tax increment financing 
(Hall & Bartels, 2014; Nguyen-Hoang, 2018). As discussed, promoting economic 
development is an essential function of local governments and requires cooperation 
between municipalities and private investors. Tax increment financing (TIF) is one of the 
options that local governments can use to encourage economic development in a specific 
area. It allows local governments to increase property tax revenue based on expected 
higher property values following investment in a TIF district. TIF is also an incentive tool 
that can boost local economies (Yadavalli & Landers, 2017). Local governments often 
issue bonds to finance TIF projects because municipalities expect increased tax revenues 
to be generated as a result of the projects. If all goes as planned, TIFs can fund 
redevelopment programs and the construction of infrastructure. However, the evaluation 
of the previous studies about TIFs is also controversial, like other economic development 
policies.  
Despite the popularity of research on TIF, not much attention has been devoted to 
a comprehensive review of past literature on this popular fiscal tool (Brueckner, 2001). 
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The main focus of the previous studies is whether TIF programs can produce planned 
desirable output in a relevant area. Although there are many studies, it is difficult to 
recognize the relevant economic development and TIF overall issues because each study 
usually focuses on a specific program and area. In this regard, it is necessary to find 
unsatisfactory and undeveloped research topics and issues about economic development 
policies by reviewing previous TIF studies. In light of this, the purpose of this paper is to 
review previous TIF studies relating to the controversy surrounding the program. One of 
the contributions of this study is summarizing the relevant economic development issues 
and finding weak spots in current studies to suggest further studies. This study bridges 
this gap by the following methods. First, this paper will provide a brief background on 
economic development such as tax-based incentives. Then, it will review TIF studies, 
including discussions of the definition of TIF, its rationale, process, and present status. 
Finally, this study will summarize the issues and suggest further studies.  
1.2 Economic Development  
Many countries have used economic development policies to address population 
growth, competition among municipalities, and war. Limited resources tend to make it 
difficult at the national level. State and local governments usually experience more 
difficulty than federal governments during an economic crisis because they lack financial 
resources and professional manpower. This concern is becoming a reality. State and local 
governments face a particular challenge: the high rate of unemployment after a recent 
economic crisis (Wu, 2012). This means that the local government must devote more 
money to the unemployed and face a decline in revenue because of economic downturn. 
In this situation, if the state and local governments use inappropriate policy tools, there 
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may be a negative impact on the local government and a delay in the pace of economic 
recovery (Wu, 2012).  
To overcome this situation, state and local governments need to be aware of how 
a change in economic development policies can influence the economic situation. This is 
because economic development policies that usually benefit a specific type of 
government are not designed to benefit other municipalities In addition, there is 
increasing demand for state and local governments “to do something about jobs” (Bartik, 
2012, p.545). As municipalities take action on economic development, tax increment 
financing (TIF) has been regarded as the most compelling alternative public financing 
tool (Briffaulff, 2010).  
Although there is always significant doubt about the effectiveness of an economic 
development policy such as business incentives (Warner & Zheng, 2013), these policies 
have been used for long periods and adapted with the times. The use and adoption of 
economic development policies became a common tool between the 1970s and the 1990s. 
This trend naturally led to intense competition among the municipalities (Buss, 2001; 
Watson, 1995). In general, three waves or types of economic development policies are 
acknowledged in the previous studies (Zheng & Warner, 2010). A business attraction 
strategy is the first wave. The characteristics of this tool are defined by programs that 
pursue or target a specific business to expand or relocate to local governments (Zheng & 
Warner, 2010). The classic examples of business attraction among economy development 
policies are tax exemptions, direct payments, and subsidized loans (Koven & Lyons, 
2006; Olberding, 2002). The second wave of economic development strategy, business 
retention, differs slightly from the previous wave. Specifically, this strategy focuses 
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mainly on existing businesses and firms that cluster locally through the provision of 
marketing support and improvement of local infrastructure (Christopherson & Clark, 
2007; Porter, 2000). In other words, this strategy is aimed at maintaining the competitive 
edge of local government (Fosler, 1992). The typical example of the second wave 
economic development policy is technical support, marketing, and revolving loans funds 
that promote the remaining businesses in the community (Olberding, 2002). While these 
first and second wave policies have received considerable attention, they have drawn 
sharp criticism from previous studies. The greatest criticism of these two waves of 
policies is that the benefits of these policies are concentrated on a specific group, such as 
highly skilled workers and businesses requiring high skills (Koven & Lyons, 2006).  
  Lastly, the third wave of economic development policy extended the scope of 
policy targets. This type of policy has more diverse objectives than the previous waves: 
(1) promoting public investment for improving quality of life and (2) correcting social 
justice for the local community (Warner, 2001). Compared to the previous policy waves, 
this one tends to consider the overall community level. For example, microenterprises for 
small business owners and development policies for low-density areas are typical 
examples of third wave policies (Bennett & Giloth, 2008; Gunn & Gunn, 1991). This 
type of strategy has become common among local governments since 2000 (Bennett & 
Giloth, 2008). Because the purpose of a TIF program is to revive deteriorating or blighted 
areas to achieve overall community development, it is classified as a third-wave policy 
type. However, tax credit, the other research subject, is included in the first wave of 
policy strategy because tax credit policy is generally granted to specific firms and groups. 
In this sense, it would be meaningful to analyze the extent to which competition has an 
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effect on municipalities’ decision-making regarding economic development priorities, as 
well as how it differently affects the extensive use of each business incentive as an 
economic development policy.  
 
1.2.1 Definition of Economic Development 
Local governments in the U.S. have continuously made efforts to retain business 
or to attract investment. This is because intense competition among municipalities could 
easily cause a local government to backslide from the current economic status if 
municipalities shirk their responsibility and fail to correctly diagnose their circumstances. 
To maintain their current position, the adoption of economic development policies and 
incentives to attract business is the main and easiest method that has been widely 
accepted among the municipalities. Economic development policy is a generic term to 
describe the process that is aimed at increasing or improving communities’ social well-
being and material status (Bowman, 1988). Each government has different goals when 
adopting economic development policies. Specifically, the primary purposes of an 
economic development policy consist of providing job opportunities, increasing capital 
investment, and promoting community development (Bowman, 1988). 
First, we will discuss how economic development has been defined. The broad 
consensus is that it refers to “Changes that affect a local economy’s capacity to create 
wealth for local residents” (Bartik, 2012, p.545). More specifically, it refers to: 
State and local governments making an effort to boost or secure employment 
opportunities or business activity in an area. The way of improving the relevant area is 
based on existing natural, human, and institutional resources (Leigh & Blakely, 2013). 
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The main goal of local economic development is to provide more local employment 
opportunities for residents (Leigh & Blakely, 2013).  
Therefore, various economic indicators could be used as reference points for state 
and local economic situations. New plants, population growth, employment growth, 
foreign direct investment, and new plant openings are economic indicators (Wu, 2012). 
In the literature, there are two types of factors that influence economic development. The 
first are nonfiscal factors (Wu, 2012). These include, for example, labor quality, market 
demand, energy costs, climate, and natural resources. The second type are fiscal factors 
(Wu, 2012). These include state and local government taxes of corporations and firms. 
Because TIF is a fiscal factor, this paper will focus on the second type. The difference 
between nonfiscal and fiscal factors depends on whether the government has control. The 
government can easily control tax policy. However, it is difficult for the government to 
control nonfiscal factors. 
1.2.2 Evaluation Standard for Economic Development 
A value judgement is required to estimate degrees of economic development. This 
is because each person has different criteria for assessment. To address this problem, 
Courant (1994) proposed some criteria of assessment. According to him, policies should 
focus on improving economic welfare (Greenbaum, Russell, & Petras, 2010). However, 
the meaning of economic welfare can be vague. As such, it is necessary to define 
economic welfare in order to specify the variables. The meaning of economic welfare 
relates to how well the policies are structured (Peters & Fisher, 2004).  
Studies on economic development are numerous and diverse. However, the results 
of these studies have not given us clear guidance in terms of effectiveness (Patrick, 
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2014). Indeed, research into the impacts of TIF have produced mixed results (Greenbaum 
& Landers, 2014). 
1.2.3 Present Condition of Economic Development 
Two types of research are being carried out to obtain more conclusive information 
on local economic development. One type of research looks at general tax policies, while 
the other type examines incentives in specific business fields. Recently, research flow has 
shifted from tax policies to tax incentives (Wu, 2008). 
1.2.3.1 General Tax Policies 
Many policy makers in the United States have focused substantial attention on the 
role of tax policy in economic development. A substantial body of research has examined 
the effects of tax policies on local economic development. One of the major questions 
about this field is the degree to which higher taxation distorts business activities. 
Generally, statistical results have indicated that major local taxes tend to have a negative 
effect on business employment (Wu, 2012). Local property tax has been one of the main 
subjects discussed in relation to economic development. Specifically, property and 
income taxes have had significantly negative effects on job location in the Philadelphia 
metropolitan area (Luce, 1994). Furthermore, in the Chicago area, a high property tax 
rate has hampered business location decisions (Dye, McGuire, & Merriman, 2001). If 
there is a tax cut, it will have a positive impact on employment growth (Zidar, 2019). 
However, there are different results concerning the effect of government tax policy on 
development. For example, a few studies suggest that there is no statistically significant 
effect on economic development (McGuire, 2003; Wasylenko, & McGuire, 1985). 
McGuire (2003) argues that just eight estimated tax coefficients are significant, and this 
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is strong evidence for the insignificant effect of taxes. Other previous studies also suggest 
that the average tax rate is not statistically related to economic growth, such as GDP 
(Agell, Lindh, & Ohlsson, 1997; Koester & Kormendi, 1989). 
To date, previous studies have not shown an empirical consensus about general 
tax policies (Wu, 2012). It is no wonder that discrepancies exist about the results because 
over 50 variables are significantly associated with economic activities (Levine & Renelt, 
1992). At the same time, these mixed results induce us to do more comprehensive 
empirical research. 
1.2.3.2 Tax Incentives 
Business or economic-development incentives are “tax breaks, cash, or services 
that are at least somewhat customized to the need(s) of an individual business and are 
awarded with some discretion” (Bartik & Erickcek, 2014, p. 315). For example, state and 
local governments may designate a specific area as an enterprise zone to induce private 
investment. If a firm moves to the targeted area, it receives benefits, including tax 
abatements. In return, governments expect to boost the local economy by attracting more 
investment and increasing employment and consumption. In other words, the purpose of 
business incentives is to impact business expansion, openings, and location.  
During an economic crisis, state and local governments usually experience more 
difficulties than the federal government because they often lack financial resources and 
professional staff to weather the storm and have difficulty running budgetary deficits. 
Currently, the primary challenge facing state and local governments is the high rate of 
unemployment after the recent economic crisis (Wu, 2012). In addition, increasing 
demand exists for state and local governments “to do something about jobs” (Bartik, 
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2012, p. 545). Local governments need to devote more money to unemployed people 
while facing a decline in revenue brought on by economic downturns. In such situations, 
local and state governments try nearly everything to increase private investment and job 
creation. Rubin described this effort as “shooting anything that flies and claiming 
anything that falls” (Rubin, 1988, p. 236). However, raising taxes may affect the local 
government negatively and delay the pace of economic recovery in the current situation 
(Wu, 2012). For instance, higher taxes on firms may add to the cost of business.  
To overcome this situation, state and local governments actively have engaged in 
tax-based incentives, the rationale behind which is that they lead to business investment 
and new jobs, stimulating local demand for goods and services, and giving rise to further 
rounds of economic growth. However, differences of opinion exist on this point. 
Furthermore, policymakers who favor this approach argue that economic growth 
increases public revenue, allowing for improved public services or a decrease in tax rates 
(Peters & Fisher, 2004).  However, certain studies criticize economic-incentive policies 
for often being wasteful and having, at best, a minor impact on growth in employment or 
investment (Hanson, 2009; Neumark & Kolko, 2010).  
Most states have several types of tax-based incentives, such as tax credits, tax 
exemptions, and infrastructure investments (Pew Center Report, 2012). Tax-based 
incentives substantially have grown over the past 25 years, but they vary from state to 
state. Figure 1.1 shows this variation. The darker the color, the more tax-based incentives 
offered by the state.  
The first map shows the status of tax-based incentives in 1990, when few state 
governments used them. Those that made extensive use of them include Nebraska, 
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Michigan, and New York. The second map shows the variation in tax-based incentives 
from 1990 to 2000. The shade of color used indicates the difference between tax 
incentives from 1990 to 2000. State governments actively increased the use of tax-based 
incentives during this time. Kentucky is one example. The third map reveals the 
differences in tax-based incentives between 2000 and 2007. Although tax-incentive use 
continued to increase, the pace slowed down. The last map depicts the variation from 
2007 to 2015. Overall, some states cut back on tax-based incentives while others 
increased their use. The figures demonstrate that state governments favored tax-based 
incentive policies from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Now, it seems that the situation 
dictates whether a state will utilize such policies. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 State variations in tax-based incentives  
(Source: Upjohn Institute). 
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1.2.3.3 Economic Effects of Tax-based Incentives 
Many studies have argued that tax-based incentives fail to achieve their intended 
policy outcomes. They have attributed the problem with current policies to the local 
decision-making process, as local policymakers often overestimate the benefits of 
incentives. Moreover, this debate is dominated by business interests (Bartik, 2005). For 
example, state and local governments often provide tax incentives where job creation is 
too expensive or is unlikely to improve the employment opportunities of residents 
(Bartik, 2005). In addition, many tax incentives target firms or industries rather than 
people in need. Peters and Fisher (2004) examined both tax-based incentives—such as 
property tax abatements, tax-increment financing, sales tax exemptions, and credits for 
investment or jobs—as well as non-tax incentives, such as business grants, loans, and 
loan guarantees. They found that, in all cases, the firm was the initial recipient of the 
incentive.  
Since the 1980s, researchers have conducted studies to determine the factors that 
are important for determining a firm’s location. According to the previous literature, state 
and local taxes did not significantly affect a firm’s location (Buss, 2001). Some studies 
have found that incentives have a negligible impact on a firm’s location and investment 
decisions because state and local taxes constitute a small fraction—approximately 
1.8%—of an average company’s costs of doing business (Bartik, 2003; Betz et al., 2012; 
Davis, 2013; Felix & Hines, 2013). Peters and Fisher (2004) found that, in as many as 
nine times out of ten, firms would hire or invest even absent the incentive.  
Until the 1990s, few attempts were made to distinguish general tax policy and 
public service (Bartik & Erickcek, 2014). By the late 2000s, many studies had examined 
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the effects of business incentives. Several have analyzed the overall business or several 
incentives (Calcagno & Thompson, 2004; Gabe & Kraybill, 2002; Lee, 2008). A few 
studies have focused on specific cases, such as new factories that received business 
incentives (Edmiston, 2004; Fox & Murray, 2004). Others have analyzed one type of 
business incentive, such as enterprise zones, customized job training, manufacturing 
extension services, tax-increment financing districts, or tax credits tied to job creation 
(Bartik & Erickcek, 2014). Table 1.1 briefly summarize the key literature on the 
economic effects of tax-based incentives (TIFs).  
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Table 1.1 Summary of the key literature on the economic effects of tax-based incentives 
(TIFs). 
Author 
(year) 
Study subject Time 
period 
Unit of 
analysis 
Analytic 
method 
Are economic 
development 
incentives 
effective? 
Holzer et 
al. (1993) 
State-financed 
training grant 
program 
1987–
1989 
Michigan Difference in 
differences 
Yes, the grant 
program achieved 
the goal. 
Wassmer 
(1994) 
TIF projects 1947–
1992 
Detroit Regression 
analysis 
Yes, they had a 
positive impact on 
retail employment 
and retail sales.  
Peters and 
Fisher 
(2004) 
Business 
incentives 
1961–
2002 
Previous 
studies 
Comprehensive 
reviews 
No, it is necessary 
to radically 
change incentive 
policies 
Bartik 
(2005) 
Economic 
development 
policies  
1986–
2004 
Research 
literature 
Comprehensive 
reviews 
No, they are too 
expensive. 
Goetz et 
al. (2011) 
State 
economic 
performance 
2000–
2007 
State Benchmark 
regressions 
No, they are more 
likely to harm 
growth.  
Bartik and 
Erickcek 
(2014) 
MEGA tax 
credit program  
1996–
2007 
Michigan  Regional 
economic 
model 
No, there was no 
positive effect on 
employment 
growth.  
Lester 
(2014) 
TIF 1990–
2008 
Chicago Difference in 
differences 
No, there was no 
evidence of 
economic 
benefits.  
 
Some studies have revealed that business incentives are not only inefficient: They 
also have no positive effect on employment growth (Bartik & Erickcek, 2014). Goetz, 
Partridge, Rickman, and Majumdar  (2011) examined the extent to which economic 
development policies promote growth and produce economic gains across the population. 
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They found no evidence of the effectiveness of lower taxes on a state’s economic 
performance, suggesting that targeted tax incentives and financial assistance are more 
likely to harm growth and income inequality. The likely reason is that lower taxes may 
reduce government revenue—which could be used to provide services such as education 
and infrastructure—without expanding or increasing employment. If this is the case, such 
a policy not only fails to bring promised economic benefits to a community but also 
wastes money states could otherwise use to build a solid foundation for economic 
development (Williams, 2017). On the other hand, several studies have indicated that 
customized job training has a positive impact on the local area (Hollenbeck, 2008; 
Holzer, Block, Cheatham, & Knott, 1993; Hoyt & Jepsen, 2008). Although recent trends 
have shifted toward building a firm’s capacity, developing human capital, and enhancing 
quality of life, economic-development policy historically has focused on attracting new 
businesses or preventing companies from leaving by offering financial incentives, usually 
in the form of tax abatements. As research on business incentives offers mixed results, it 
is necessary to analyze why state and local governments still actively use tax-based 
incentives with uncertain results.  
Generally, there are two justifications for why local governments have adopted 
economic incentives. Peter (1988) provided two reasons: (1) Economic incentives are 
expected to increase business investment, thereby creating new jobs, which will facilitate 
economic growth; (2) This economic growth will increase local government revenue, 
which will improve the quality of public services. TIF is also a place-based incentive and 
addresses both justifications as a policy tool.  
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1.3 Tax Increment Financing 
1.3.1 What is TIF? 
The National Association of Home Builders’ report evaluated TIF as the most popular 
financing tool among state practices (Kane & Weber, 2016; Smith, 2006). In the 1980s, 
fiscal responsibility shifted from federal to local government. This trend contributed to 
the proliferation of TIF as a policy tool (Huddleston, 1981; Weber & O’Neill-Kohl, 
2013). Historically, many people have supported TIF because it is a self-financing 
economic development tool that does not lead to reduced government revenue 
(Greenbaum & Landers, 2014). This self-financing characteristic distinguishes it from 
other economic development programs such as tax credits, tax abatements, enterprise 
zones, and other subsidy programs.  
 
Figure 1.2 The mechanism of TIF 
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Figure 1.2 explains the process of Tax Increment Financing (TIF). Local governments 
must borrow capital when they implement a TIF project, and they usually use bond 
issuance to finance its development. Both public and private economic activities have 
been increased due to TIF projects. Thus, they have led to a net inflow of economic 
activities. Finally, the effects of the activities give rise to higher property tax revenues, 
which will be used to repay revenue bonds and interest. This process is the basic concept 
of TIF. 
When implementing a TIF program, local government officials are typically 
deeply involved because they designate TIF program areas, which are expected to finance 
certain aspects of economic development. Growth in local tax revenue is expected in the 
TIF program area. Specifically, there are two components: base revenues and incremental 
revenues. Base revenues refer to a certain amount of total tax revenues before a TIF 
program is implemented. Incremental revenues indicate the difference between excess 
future revenues and base revenues. TIF projects lead to excess revenues compared to base 
revenues. Based on incremental revenues, local governments that implement TIF 
programs independently provide residents with economic development subsidies to 
promote economic growth and to cover program expenditure. This is the basic logic of 
TIF programs. 
1.3.2 Local Policy Environment 
Discussing the TIF should be preceded by explaining the local policy environment 
because this influences the local TIF projects. There are two essential concepts in the 
local policy area, “Dillon’s rule” and “Home rule.” Specifically, Dillon’s rule originated 
from Clark v. City of Des Moines (1865) (Richardson, 2011). It indicates that local 
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government could have power and authority when the state government clearly grants 
such authority (Richardson, Gough, & Puentes, 2003). Now, 39 states adopt Dillon’s rule 
when they define the authority of local government, and 31 states apply Dillon’s rule to 
the entire local area (Richardson, 2011). The majority of U.S. states currently employ 
Dillon’s rule.  
The adoption of the Home rule began with backlash against the current Dillon’s 
rule. Specifically, Dillon’s rule did not efficiently control local governments, and state 
legislatures failed to specify the role of local governments (Barron, 2003). The definition 
of the Home rule is that local governments could have their power and authority through 
the state constitution and legislative action. It means that local governments with the 
Home rule tend to have more discretionary authority than local governments with 
Dillon’s rule.  
If we apply this issue to the TIF project, we realize that TIF projects have 
characteristics of both rules. Specifically, most state governments enable local 
governments to undertake TIF projects through each state TIF legislation. In other words, 
local governments could have discretionary authority by state government grant. At the 
same time, local governments usually have enough power to enact policy in the TIF 
projects. In this sense, TIF, one of the main economic development policies, is a mixture 
of both rules.   
1.3.3 The TIF Process and Conditions 
State legislation allows municipalities to use TIF. Most state laws specify detailed 
checklists and activities for operating and establishing a TIF program. Each state has a 
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different implementation scope and process (Kane & Weber, 2016). Nonetheless, there 
are generally two common denominators regarding preconditions for TIF. First, many 
states require a certain amount of evidence regarding blight (Weber & O’Neill-Kohl, 
2013). For example, Illinois requires five types of evidence: blighted area, excessive 
vacancy, obsolescence, deleterious land use layout, lack of ventilation, and proof of 
below structure minimum code standard (Kane & Weber, 2016). After this first condition 
is met, the municipality needs to demonstrate the “but for” condition. This refers to 
whether, without the benefit of a TIF program, a designated area will fail to experience 
economic growth (Briffaulff, 2010). When these two preconditions are satisfied, local 
governments can establish a TIF ordinance and designate a certain area as a TIF district.  
 To implement TIF, municipalities should carefully select a specific geographic 
area for redevelopment in order to increase tax revenue to offset the cost of development. 
During this process, local governments generally issue debt, such as revenue bonds, to 
cover the costs of developing the designated area (Kane & Weber, 2016). If the TIF 
project achieves its goals—namely, inducing private investment and making the district 
an attractive place to do business—then property prices will increase. This increment will 
cover TIF-related expenses. The creation of such a virtuous circle is the intent behind the 
basic TIF process. 
1.3.4 The Goal and Rationale of TIF 
The fundamental purpose of this policy tool is to promote redevelopment and 
economic development. This goal is present in TIF legislation, which is designed to 
revive blighted or deteriorating local areas and to create new jobs (Kane & Weber, 2016). 
In this sense, TIF is regarded as a catalyst for local development. To achieve this goal, 
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public investment in deteriorating areas that are less likely to induce new business or 
investment without public intervention should be prioritized. According to Bland and 
Overton (2014), public investment is necessary for a partnership’s success. Such a 
partnership is based on private investment that will increase local property values. 
Ultimately, the goal of TIF is to attract investment from private companies and sectors to 
achieve economic development.  
1.3.5 Trends in TIF and the Present Status of TIF 
In 1952, California became the first state to begin using TIF (Lefcoe & Swenson, 
2014). After TIF was authorized, many states began using TIF, leading to a dramatic 
increase in its implementation during the 1970s and 1980s (Greenbaum & Landers, 
2014). California passed Proposition 13 in 1978, which limited local governments’ ability 
to increase property taxes for tax revenues (Dardia, 1998). Proposition 13 directed 
municipalities to find alternative policy tools for capital improvement (Lefcoe & 
Swenson, 2014). Before TIF, municipalities had three options to encourage 
redevelopment. The first option was the abatement of property taxes. The second was for 
cities to use fund project that are not included in general funds. The third option was to 
issue general obligation bonds (Weber, 2010). In this regard, tax reform was a catalyst for 
the proliferation of TIF.  
Currently, the District of Columbia and 49 states have diverse forms of TIF 
totaling thousands of TIF districts in the United States (Krohe & Boyanoski, 2007; 
Lester, 2014). For example, the city of Chicago has 145 TIF districts (Spielman, 2015). 
Chicago experienced a $400 million increase in tax revenues, which was used to finance 
reimbursement (Spielman, 2015). In 1999, Arizona became the first state to repeal TIF 
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legislation (Weber & O’Neill-Kohl, 2013). In 2012, California ended the use of TIF 
(Lefcoe & Swenson, 2014). First, the state of Arizona repealed the TIF legislation 
because the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the legislation was unconstitutional 
(Lefcoe, 2010). Specifically, the Supreme Court ruled that a more stringent inquiry was 
necessary to argue the public purpose of TIF projects. Second, the state of California 
ended the use of TIF for practical reasons. When the state government decided to end the 
use of TIF, the state had 425 redevelopment agencies involved in the project (Thomas, 
2012). These agencies typically oversaw projects to the value of approximately $8 billion 
every year. This total TIF project value exceeded the permissible range of the state 
government because the state government had declared a fiscal emergency in 2010. Many 
local governments still use TIF as a first option among incentive programs. Even so, the 
TIF reversal in California has had serious implications for TIF policy. In other words, the 
time is right to conduct a review of the TIF policy tool.  
Table 1.2 and Figure 1.3 below show sources of eligible tax revenue by state. All 
states use property tax revenues to capture tax increments. We suggest that the success or 
failure of TIF policy closely depends on whether property values within each district 
increased after the implementation of TIF. The next highest eligible source is sales tax 
revenues. Sixteen states use property tax and sales tax revenues for TIF sources. If a state 
uses sales tax as a revenue source, the projects will be closely related to retail TIFs. This 
policy decision involves two issues: (1) the difficulty of predicting sales tax revenue; and 
(2) that variation causes greater risk regarding the sustainability of tax revenue. 
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Figure 1.3 Eligible revenue sources by state 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49
16
7
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Property tax Sales tax PILOT
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
S
ta
te
s
23 
 
Table 1.2 Tax increment finance state-by-state  
State Year  
Authorized 
Eligible Tax Revenue Source 
TIF counts 
Property tax  Sales tax PILOTs 
Alabama 1987 ✓    Unknown 
Alaska 2001 ✓    1 
Arizona N/A    0 
Arkansas 2001 ✓   ✓  9 
California 1952 ✓    743 
Colorado 1975 ✓  ✓  ✓  140 
Connecticut 1959 ✓  ✓   4 
Delaware 2002 ✓    0 
Florida 1969 ✓    222 
Georgia 1985 ✓    64 
Hawaii 1985 ✓    Unknown 
Idaho 1987 ✓    78 
Illinois 1977 ✓  ✓   1238 
Indiana 1981 ✓   ✓  700 to 800 
Iowa 1969 ✓  ✓   3340 
Kansas 1976 ✓  ✓  ✓  11 
Kentucky 2000 ✓  ✓   23 
Louisiana 1988 ✓    9 
Maine 1977 ✓    483 
Maryland 1980 ✓    28 
Massachusetts 2003 ✓    Unknown 
Michigan 1975 ✓    634 
Minnesota 1979 ✓    1719 
Mississippi 1986 ✓  ✓   25 
Missouri 1982 ✓  ✓  ✓  468 
Montana 1974 ✓    50 
Nebraska 1978 ✓    828 
Nevada 1959 ✓    22 
New Hampshire 1979 ✓    32 
New Jersey 2009 ✓  ✓  ✓  49 
New Mexico 2006 ✓  ✓   16 
New York 1984 ✓    2 
North Carolina 2004 ✓    3 
North Dakota 1973 ✓    48 
Ohio 1976 ✓    1278 
Oklahoma 1992 ✓  ✓   48 
Oregon 1960 ✓    244 
Pennsylvania 1990 ✓  ✓  ✓  Unknown 
Rhode Island 1956 ✓    5 
South Carolina 1984 ✓    17 
South Dakota 1978 ✓    172 
Tennessee 1978 ✓  ✓   29 
Texas 1983 ✓  ✓   1378 
Utah 1968 ✓  ✓   84 
Vermont 1985 ✓    9 
Virginia 1988 ✓    9 
Washington 2001 ✓  ✓   38 
West Virginia 2002 ✓    31 
Wisconsin 1975 ✓    1241 
Wyoming 1983 ✓    Unknown 
Source: Tax increment Finance State-by-State Report by Council of Development Finance Agencies 
(CDFA) (Merriman, Qiao, & Zhao, 2018). 
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1.4 Literature Review: Classification of Previous Studies on TIF 
Many previous TIF studies have been conducted in magazines, newspaper 
articles, books, and academic journal articles. In addition, many references have been 
accumulated over time. This paper will mainly address recent empirical studies. Most 
previous studies have focused on output or outcomes of TIF in specific municipalities.  
Some studies have also analyzed the effects of TIF on tax revenues, employment growth, 
and sales. This review will begin by examining the previous studies that have analyzed 
land valuation. Next, the effect of TIF on other outcomes will be reviewed. To do this, 
previous findings will be placed into appropriate categories.  
 
1.4.1 Land Valuation Studies 
 Many studies have closely analyzed the effect of TIF on land valuation. As an 
economic development tool, the influence of TIF on real estate value is a key topic in 
academic debate (Weber, 2003). Some studies have found that the adoption of TIF had a 
positive impact on overall property values (Anderson, 1990; Dardia, 1998; Man & 
Rosentraub, 1998; Wassmer & Anderson, 2001; Yadavalli & Landers, 2017). For 
example, Anderson (1990) found that cities that adopted TIF experienced greater growth 
in property values compared to cities without TIF. However, not all studies that have 
analyzed the effects of TIF on property values have found the same result. For instance, a 
few studies have concluded that TIF projects failed to increase property values because 
TIF projects did not offset investment costs (Dardia, 1998; Merriman, Skidmore, & 
Kashian, 2011). However, Dye and Merriman (2000) found that municipalities with TIF 
saw an increase in property values while property value growth in municipalities with 
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TIF was lower than in municipalities without TIF. These mixed results have led to the 
continuation of controversy over the effects of TIF. 
1.4.2 Building Valuation Studies 
 Compared to land valuation studies, fewer studies have analyzed the effect of TIF 
on building values. Smith (2006) found that the values of buildings located in TIF 
districts showed greater rates of property value growth than buildings in districts without 
TIF. In their study of Chicago, Byrne (2006) found that TIF projects led to about a 30% 
faster growth rate in property value than in areas without TIF projects. Weber, Bhatta, 
and Merriman (2003) also analyzed the Chicago area. They classified buildings into three 
categories: industrial, commercial, and residential properties. They found that industrial 
buildings in mixed-use districts showed greater property value growth rates than other 
building types (Weber et al., 2003). This research did not produce consistent results, 
however. For example, Merriman et al. (2011) found no significant growth rate for 
industrial and residential properties. The mixed and limited results of studies 
investigating the effects of TIF projects on property values suggest a need for future 
research.  
1.4.3 Unit of Analysis  
 Early studies on TIF have usually analyzed the effects of TIF projects on specific 
municipalities. More specifically, these early studies have compared municipalities that 
have TIF projects with municipalities that do not have TIF projects (Anderson, 1990; Dye 
& Merriman, 2000; Man & Rosentraub, 1998). For example, using the municipalities of 
Michigan as a case study, Anderson (1990) found that cities with TIF showed greater 
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growth rates in property value than cities without TIF. Man and Rosentraub (1998) also 
used the city as their unit of analysis, finding the same result in Indiana as the Anderson 
study found in Michigan. (Dye & Merriman, 2000) achieved consistent results by using 
TIF area as a unit of analysis. This method is logical because it directly compares the 
effects of TIF. However, using TIF districts is not easy because it is difficult to collect 
observational data about TIF projects and to find non-TIF areas with similar conditions. 
To increase the validity of their results, recent studies have used the propensity score 
matching method (Funderburg, 2018).  
 A few studies have used census data to control for the demographic characteristics 
of the TIF district. Representative of such a research approach is Lester (2014), which 
used block group level to analyze the effects of the TIF district. According to his paper, 
block group data is a reasonable unit of analysis because it enables researcher to combine 
socioeconomic and demographic data with other data (Lester, 2014). Gibson (2003) used 
census tract data when analyzing Chicago TIF areas. When used in this way, census 
geographic data has clear research benefits. Furthermore, when demographic information 
is necessary, multiple datasets can be included. On the other hand, there is a problem with 
this data because it might be difficult to match block group or census tract data to TIF 
project areas. It is always possible that TIF projects will have different sizes than census 
tracts indicate.  
 Lastly, some studies have used parcel level data as a unit of analysis. For instance, 
Weber et al. (2003) analyzed the effects of TIF in Chicago by using parcel levels. 
According to their study, the effect of TIF projects could differ depending on the type of 
parcel used, such as industrial, residential, or commercial (Weber et al., 2003).  
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 This review of previous studies suggests that there are several ways to estimate 
the effects of TIF projects. Nonetheless, most studies have used property value as the key 
element for analyzing the effects of TIF. This is because it provides researchers with 
direct information. In future studies, it would be useful to understand the strength of each 
data level.  
1.4.4 Economic Development Outcomes  
 Previous studies have analyzed the economic development outcomes of TIF 
projects.  Man (1999) analyzed Indiana municipalities between 1985 and 1992 and found 
a positive relationship between TIF projects and local employment. Wassmer (1994), 
whose study was conducted in Detroit, analyzed more economic development outcomes 
than did Man (1999). These included sales in manufacturing and retail, as well as 
employment. It was also conducted over a longer period (1947–1997). Wassmer (1994) 
found that TIF projects had statistically significant and positive impacts on retail 
employment rates and retail sales. However, modern studies have conflicted with 
previous studies. For example, Byrne (2010) studied Illinois cities between 1981 and 
1999 to analyze the effects of TIF and found that TIF projects had a negative impact on 
retail employment in general. However, when he focused on industrial development, his 
findings showed a positive relationship between employment and TIF projects. 
Moreover, Lester (2014) analyzed business creation and employment in Chicago between 
1990 and 2008 by using block group data and the propensity score matching method. He 
did not find any effect of TIF on employment and private investment. Although some 
studies have analyzed economic development outcomes, the results were mixed regarding 
TIF projects.  
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1.4.5 Fiscal Outcomes 
 Some studies have analyzed the effects of TIF on fiscal outcomes, such as tax 
revenues. These studies have usually compared the cost of the TIF project with increases 
in revenues. Huddleston (1981) examined 16 TIF projects in the Wisconsin area from the 
1970s. According to his projected estimate, only 10 of 16 local governments would break 
even within 20 years. Dardia (1998) examined the California TIF districts to analyze how 
TIF impacted the property tax increment. He used a control group that did not adopt TIF 
projects to analyze the true TIF effect. He found that less than 25% of TIF districts 
recovered more than their TIF costs or broke even (Dardia, 1998). Kriz (2001) used a 
Monte Carlo simulation to analyze the effect of TIF on fiscal outcomes based on several 
assumptions about public expenditure, tax rates, property value growth, and other policies 
regarding local Minnesota governments. Based on these reasonable assumptions, he 
concluded that local governments with TIF projects were likely to experience financial 
loss (Kriz, 2001). These previous studies suggest that TIF projects are not likely to 
generate a net gain for their municipalities. In other words, many local governments have 
failed to enjoy the expected effects of TIF. Greenbaum and Landers (2014) suggested two 
reasons: (1) There is a possibility that growth in property values may have occurred 
regardless of TIF projects; (2) Other economic development tools that do not include TIF 
led to the growth in property values. At the same time, they argued that TIF could have 
an impact on income, business activity, and employment (Greenbaum & Landers, 2014). 
A few studies have supported this argument, claiming that TIF has a positive impact on 
business establishment, employment, and sales activity (Byrne, 2010; Lester, 2014; Man, 
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1999; Wassmer, 1994). In conclusion, for accurate assessment, more comprehensive 
analyses that include other tax revenues are needed. 
1.4.6 Evaluation of Previous TIF Studies 
 A substantial body of research has analyzed the effectiveness of TIF in 
municipalities. Many studies have also evaluated the TIF system itself. Overall, there is a 
great deal of support for TIF. First, municipalities may have greater tax revenues due to 
TIF projects (Nguyen-Hoang, 2018). Such increases in tax revenues are the principal 
reason for the diffusion of TIF. Second, TIF has been evaluated as a flexible tool because 
TIF-related decisions are typically made at the local level without approval of state or 
federal government (Greifer, 2005). For example, enterprise zone programs as well as 
state and federal grant programs require several time-consuming approval and application 
processes. The relative flexibility of TIF enables local governments to more easily adopt 
TIF programs. Third, TIF is a “self-financing” policy tool. This is because the increased 
property tax base brought about by TIF could be devoted entirely to expenditure on 
public infrastructure. This strength could be appealing to local governments reluctant to 
increase the tax burden (Greenbaum & Landers, 2014). Lastly, TIF enables municipalities 
to avoid the debt limit. Many states still limit the amount of debt in local government, and 
a complicated process is required for a municipality to issue more. However, if a local 
government links a TIF project to a special revenue obligation, the bonds are not 
perceived as “debt” (Selby & Hunter, 2004). Many previous studies have pointed to these 
advantages. If a TIF district did not exist, developers would have to pay infrastructure 
costs. TIF ensures that property taxes are used to pay for infrastructure that directly 
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benefits the developer’s property or business. In this sense, TIF functions as an incentive 
for private investors to invest in a specific location (Leavitt, Morris, & Lombard, 2008).  
 Despite these advantages, several problems with TIF have been discussed in 
previous studies. First, TIF projects could lead to financial crises for local governments. 
For example, if a TIF project did not produce a proper future tax increment, there is a 
possibility that local governments might experience worsening crises or even default 
(Kane & Weber, 2016). Second, more diverse evaluation criteria are necessary for TIF 
programs in the short and long term. This is because property value growth does not 
represent the overall effect of TIF. For instance, increasing property values could 
decrease wellbeing for residents because it could force tenants to leave their homes 
(Hackworth, 2002; Newman & Wyly, 2006). In short, there are concerns regarding 
inequity between property owners and tenants. A third criticism is that it takes a long 
time for the expected outcomes of TIF projects to occur. TIF projects are usually 
conducted over long periods of at least ten years. Opponents of TIF programs have 
pointed out this problem, arguing that lengthy project periods increase program 
uncertainty (Hipler, 2007).  
1.5 Summary and Recommendations  
As with other economic development incentives, TIF is aimed at economic 
growth and the revitalization of blighted areas. According to previous studies, local 
governments might benefit from increased growth in income, private investment, and 
employment if TIF projects achieve their goals. However, previous studies of property 
value have had mixed results. Outcomes have been similar regarding fiscal and economic 
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development. According to Weber and Goddeeris (2007) , “research on the effect of TIF 
has raised more questions than it has answered” (p. 54).  This statement reflects the 
current status of TIF studies and economic development policies. At the same time, this 
situation brings into question why local governments have adopted economic 
development policies that have uncertainty about the result. This is the most urgent task 
in the economic development academic area because previous studies have not provided 
an answer in detail or even produced any issues about the reason. 
 The literature review identified several directions for future study and 
recommendations for practitioners and researchers. According to Kane and Weber 
(2016), further studies of TIF projects are essential because there is still doubt regarding 
whether TIF leads to property value growth. Greenbaum and Landers (2014) made the 
same point, also arguing that it is necessary to analyze the overall economic impact of 
TIF on municipalities. Bartels & Hall (2012) argued that too few studies have analyzed 
how internal management practices impact TIF performance. When TIF projects are 
established, local government officials intend certain goals for the project. Yadavalli and 
Landers (2017) claimed that this practice leads to inherent bias, recommending that an 
improved research method is essential to address such bias. In this regard, more detailed 
and comprehensive studies employing advanced methods are needed.  
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CHAPTER 2.  A THEORETICAL MODEL FOR A ZERO-SUM DILEMMA AND THE DIFFUSION 
MECHANISM OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES (TAX INCREMENT FINANCE) 
 
Abstract 
Tax increment finance (TIF) is intended to increase economic activity in a local 
area.  TIF has spread rapidly in recent years in America to become an essential part of the 
policies of American local government.  Research finds little evidence of aggregate 
effects on total production, consistent with TIF as a zero-sum game for local 
government.  The popularity of TIF results from local governments competing with or 
learning from other local governments, imposing fiscal externalities on each other. The 
theory is similar to the race to the bottom in costly activities like welfare spending and in 
tax cuts which result in fiscal stress on local government activity. Although little attention 
has been paid to political factors in economic development policies, they are theoretically 
closely related to the adoption and extent of fiscal incentives.  
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2.1 Introduction 
 Economic development incentives are currently the most common tool adopted by 
local and state governments (Pew Center Report, 2012). The reason why this policy tool 
became trendy is that economic development incentives tend to promise rosy futures such 
as creating jobs, economic growth, and attracting investment. Indeed, according to a 
recent New York Times investigation on incentives, the total number of incentive 
programs is 1,874, and state governments have spent about $80.4 billion per year on them 
(Story, Fehr, & Watkins, 2012). These economic development policies have become an 
essential part of the policies of American local governments (Fleischmann, Green, & 
Kwong, 1992), leading to many empirical studies that analyzed the effects of 
development policies (Wang, 2016). However, this prior academic literature fails to 
suggest a clear direction on the effectiveness of economic development incentives.  
At the same time, the popularity of these policies gives rise to strategic interaction 
between state and local governments. To be precise, a state’s or municipality’s policies 
indirectly impact other local governments’ choices. As a result, this strategic behavior 
causes state and local governments to compete via the adoption of incentives and taxes to 
win the game. Although many empirical studies about tax competition exist, their results 
do not reach any consensus (Leiser, 2017). However, there is a comparative lack of 
theoretical studies that analyze why economic development policies are structurally and 
actively adopted by local governments. While many studies have analyzed the effects of 
economic development policies, surprisingly little research has been conducted to explain 
which factors are associated with the extent of the use of economic development policies. 
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Furthermore, these economic policies face a “zero-sum dilemma” (Snow, 1995). 
For example, economic development incentives yield no significant changes regarding 
overall local economic growth indicators, such as the total number of jobs (Sridhar, 
1996). Several studies also suggest tax incentive policies are considered a zero-sum game 
(Chrinko & Wilson, 2008; Goolsbee & Maydew, 2000; Wilson, 2009). To the best of my 
knowledge, no studies have analyzed how a zero-sum game could be modeled in 
economic development policies. In this sense, it is necessary to question whether 
economic policies structurally lead to net benefits in local areas. 
This article intends to theoretically examine the proposition that tax increment 
finance (TIF) is a zero sum game, as TIF is the most popular economic policy tool (Man 
& Rosentraub, 1998), by applying the zero-sum dilemma to TIF and analyzing why the 
project does not produce the intended outcome. Additionally, the study theoretically 
highlights the diffusion mechanism of economic development policies by using TIF, 
specifically examining why adopting TIF in a community leads to TIF adoptions in other 
communities. Lastly, based on existing political theories, this article explains 
theoretically why local governments that political actors are involved with cannot desist 
from using diverse economic development policies such as TIF.  
2.2 The Characteristics of Economic Development Policy 
  When state and local governments adopt economic development policies, they 
expect to create something new, such as increasing investments and jobs. However, many 
studies do not draw conclusions about the effectiveness of economic development 
policies (Bartik & Erickcek, 2014; Patrick, 2014; Swann, 2017). There is even the 
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argument that economic development policies have a negative impact on the national 
economy (Burstein & Rolnick, 1995). Specifically, the competitive adoption of economic 
development policies causes the under-provision of public service, as these policies only 
relocate investments and businesses across locations (Bartik, 1991; Fisher & Peters, 
1997; Wang, 2016). Thus, a few studies on economic development have recognized 
policy effects as a zero-sum game (Chrinko & Wilson, 2008; Goolsbee & Maydew, 2000; 
Wilson, 2009). In this situation, we face questions regarding the reasons state and local 
governments have scrambled to implement economic development policies. 
We can easily understand the characteristics of economic development policy if 
we review the process of policy adoption. At the start of the process, as one state adopts a 
new economic development policy, the probability of other states adopting the same 
policy is increased because other state residents hear of the expected benefits (Leiser, 
2017). These states also start to experience the loss of wealth, that is, the zero-sum nature 
of damage because of the new policy. As time goes on, the comparative benefits of the 
economic development policy decrease because several other states adopted the same 
policy. In other words, early adopters can no longer enjoy their once unique benefits. 
Additionally, states that do not adopt the new policy try to differentiate from other states 
that have already adopted the policy by using other policies to attract new investors; 
indeed, the probability of adoption begins to decrease after a short peak time, with 
economic development policies tending to show an inverted U-shape adoption 
probability. This repeating process indicates that state governments recognize the use of 
economic development policies as a zero-sum game (Leiser, 2017).   
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2.3 The Purpose of Applying the Theory of Zero-Sum Games to TIF 
TIF is regarded as a powerful tool for local development. Private or public 
investment in underprivileged areas that are less likely to attract new investment or 
businesses without policy intervention proceed with TIF to achieve their goals. Most 
previous studies focused on the output or outcomes of TIF in certain municipalities. More 
specifically, these studies tended to review how property value changes after TIF 
implementation (Greenbaum & Landers, 2014). The reason for this is that growth in 
property value is the key mechanism to maintain the virtuous circle of TIF. However, 
many property value studies have had different results. 
The diffusion of TIF is the same as with other economic development policies. As 
discussed above, only a few states adopt TIF in the early stage, though most states have 
already adopted other TIF policies to keep from being left behind in the current economic 
situation. Still, TIF is clearly evaluated as a zero-sum game in previous research (Snow, 
1995). Taking this into consideration, it is reasonable to theoretically test the 
characteristics of a TIF policy as a representation of economic development policies.  
2.4 Theoretical Model for a Zero-Sum Dilemma 
The present study is based on a theoretical model of public infrastructure 
(Boarnet, 1998) , but it has been slightly modified to apply to a TIF case. This portion 
designs a model of TIF in two cities, labeled A and B. Each city has a public authority 
and both public authorities produce identical local outputs, such as public services with 
identical technologies. The local output of each public authority is evaluated by the 
national market at price p. I also assume that supply of capital and labor are perfectly 
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inelastic in each city in the short run. In the long run, both factors of local outputs can 
freely move between cities. Finally, total economic activities, such as jobs and 
businesses, are in fixed supply, as nothing is created that does not already exist. To focus 
on the effect of TIF, I also assume that there is no cost for providing public capital and F 
is a neoclassical production function.1  
Based on previous assumptions, each city produces public local outputs to 
residents according to 
Q = (G)F(L,K), 
where 
Q = city or local output, 
G = public capital, 
L = labor force, 
K = physical capital,  
In this situation, I assume that City A increases public capital due to the TIF 
project. The increased public capital with TIF will provide benefits for the owners of 
physical capital and workers in the short run. During this process, City A generally issues 
debt, such as revenue bonds, to cover the cost of increasing public capital. Thus, the 
increase in the amount of public capital is equal to the debt (D). 
 
1 The neoclassical production F(K,L) has the following properties: (1) Both factors are necessary, (2) both 
factors contribute to output, and (3) the production exhibits constant returns to scale.  
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In the long run, the increased public capital with the TIF project will be attractive 
to labor and physical capital in City B. As a result, factors (L, K) will migrate from City 
B to City A in the long run to get benefits. After the shift of factors is complete, the two 
cities’ local output is 
QA = (GA+ G-D)F(LA + L, KA + K)       G = D 
QB = (GB)F(LB - L, KA- K) 
Given that the TIF project in City A leads to local output increases in City A and 
decreases in City B, the above model demonstrates the basic logic of a zero-sum dilemma 
in a TIF project. Figure 2.1 shows the TIF program is necessarily located in the zero-sum 
line, a non-positive and non-negative sum area. Accordingly, this study proposes the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: A tax increment financing project is a zero-sum game among 
municipalities.  
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Figure 2.1 Zero-sum dilemma in TIF  
 
2.5 The Diffusion of Economic Development Policy 
States have been recognized as “laboratories of democracy” because state 
governments can experiment with diverse policies more than the federal government can 
due to considerable discretion in making public policy (Hearn, Lacy, & Warshaw, 2014). 
A state government’s novel innovation allows public officials to try experiments which 
have high-risk to implement nationwide. If a state government or local government’s new 
policy is successful, the diffusion of the policy may occur both vertically and 
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horizontally, enabling these governments to learn from other state governments’ 
experiments.  
2.5.1 The Definition of Innovation and Diffusion 
 State and local governments usually try various attempts to address social 
problems. Although most governmental actions are incremental in that they marginally 
change budgets and programs, some governments pursue innovation (Berry & Berry, 
2014). If we only analyze the incremental governmental actions, we cannot say that we 
understand policymaking because there are few innovative actions. When we usually 
think about innovation, we usually come up with something new as an innovation. 
However, in the policy area, innovation means that “governmental jurisdiction can 
innovate by adopting a program numerous other jurisdictions established many years 
before” (Berry & Berry, 2014, p.307). 
 After a state or local government adopts a new policy, other governments tend to 
follow the innovation. In that way, the innovation can spread nationwide. This process is 
called the diffusion of policy, which is defined as “the process by which an innovation is 
communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social 
system” (Berry & Berry, 2014, p.307). The same thing is happening with TIF, 
considering the growth in the number of states with the TIF since California adopted it. In 
this sense, the innovation and diffusion model could apply to TIF.  
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2.5.2 The General Mechanism for Diffusion 
 Many researchers have analyzed what leads to the diffusion of policy. At least 
four mechanisms have been discerned: learning from adopters, competition among 
nearby cities, imitation, and coercion by state governments (Shipan & Volden, 2008). 
 First, learning leads to diffusion. State governments and public officials face 
diverse social problems. In this situation, collecting all of the information related to the 
problems and identifying all of the alternatives seem to be ideal. In reality, it is 
impossible to rationally compare all of the options for finding an optimal alternative 
because of time and budget restrictions. These constraints make governments focus on 
the learning process (Berry & Berry, 2014). The learning process means that policy 
decision makers make an effort to find a policy that has already proven successful when 
they address their own social problems.      
 Second, competition can lead to diffusion. Competition is often compared to 
learning to clarify its meaning. Competition refers to individuals who are living near state 
borders, while learning usually occurs across states generally (Berry & Baybeck, 2005). 
Considering the nature of interconnectivity in the US, policy makers are more likely to 
adopt a policy if their neighboring states have it. However, there is evidence to suggest 
that adjacent state competition has not statistically influenced adoption (Hearn et al., 
2014; Miller & Richard, 2010). Furthermore, some studies have argued that states or 
local governments could easily become susceptible to a “race to the bottom” in 
generosity of benefits because of competitive federalism (Volden, 2002). In other words, 
the fear of losing local jobs and businesses could lead to the adoption of the policy.  
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 Third, imitation is one of the mechanisms for diffusion. We can understand the 
meaning of imitation through a comparison with learning. Shipan & Volden (2008) 
distinguished imitation from learning in the following way: Imitation mainly focuses on 
actors, while learning mechanisms concentrate on actions. This means that if a state 
government takes an imitation approach, it is more interested in which other governments 
adopted the policy than in the policy itself. Thus, the imitation mechanism means that 
“government A imitates government B when A adopts a policy simply in order to look 
like B” (Shipan & Volden, 2008, p842). Imitation is also called copying or emulation to 
resemble other governments. 
 Fourth, coercion leads to diffusion. Compared to other mechanisms, this 
mechanism is marked by compulsion. For example, a central government or state 
government could compel a local government through its authority and laws. Coercion 
could also originate with horizontal government through international organizations like 
the United Nations (Shipan & Volden, 2008). Although there is a horizontal case in terms 
of the coercion mechanism, the US federal system provides researchers with more 
opportunities to focus on vertical coercion (Berry & Berry, 2014). TIF is not based on 
vertical coercion because there is no mandatory regulation and state governments 
independently adopt the policy without coercion.  
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2.6 The Mechanism of Tax Competition and Economic Development Policy Diffusion 
Many state and local governments have attempted to adopt new policies to 
promote economic growth and jobs, competing with each other to generate businesses 
and households for a long time (Goetz et al., 2011). The origin of this competition is 
based on an idea from Tiebout (1956) called theory of efficient tax competition 
(Munongo, Akanbi, & Robinson, 2017). This model assumes that there is competition 
among municipalities, and this competition leads to the efficiency of public services 
(Rendon-Garza, 2006). A model from Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) also provides a 
critical theory, called the Z-M model, about tax competition, which is based on several 
assumptions: 1) there is a fixed and homogenous community; 2) each community has 
inelastic capital and elastic labor; 3) perfect competition and constant returns to scale 
technology exist; and 4) governments aim to achieve social optimization between 
taxation and public goods. The Z-M model also concludes that tax competition among 
communities leads to a shift of tax burden from mobile capital to immobile labor. 
Recently, tax competition studies have suggested that state or local governments 
compete with each other not only with taxes, but also with economic development 
policies (Leiser, 2017). In particular, although geographic proximity is not an important 
factor for economic development policy competition (Hearn et al., 2014), other 
dimensions such as industry structure facilitate competition among states (Fletcher & 
Murray, 2006). Leiser (2017) also suggested that competition actually exists among states 
regarding tax incentives, a pattern similar to a race to the bottom.     
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2.7 The Goal and Purpose of Application of the Mechanism for Diffusion 
 Many local governments have adopted TIF for similar reasons. First, local 
governments have tended to establish TIF to correct market failure (Greenbaum & 
Landers, 2014). Without public intervention, blighted areas will suffer greatly. For 
instance, local governments have used TIF to address spatial inequities, such as 
concentrated poverty and infrastructure concerns. Second, to improve efficiency, TIF has 
been widely used by local governments. Specifically, some local governments have 
attempted to foster agglomeration economies to maximize economies of scale through the 
TIF (Greenbaum & Landers, 2014). Lastly, competition among local governments has led 
to the adoption of TIF. In other words, local governments have adopted TIF because of 
competition for new investment and business among municipalities (Anderson, 1990; 
Man, 1999; Mason & Thomas, 2010). Some researchers have concluded that the 
competitive dynamics generated by the TIF policy process justify its adoption. However, 
other researchers argue that the amelioration of financial crisis is the main reason to adopt 
TIF programs. While this competitive view is often criticized, Byrne (2005) showed that 
local governments are less likely to consider neighboring governments’ decisions. 
Considering these circumstances, conducting a study about why municipalities adopt TIF 
and the mechanism of diffusion would be timely research. Therefore, the following 
section aims to apply the diffusion mechanism to TIF in order to analyze why these 
projects have spread across the country.   
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2.8 Theoretical Model for Diffusion of a TIF  
The present study is based on a conceptual Tiebout model and the model of Filer 
(1992), but slightly modified.2 The present study also adds a new residential option, 
creating a community with a TIF project beyond staying in one’s current place or moving 
to an alternative place with a TIF project, as a response to changes in the community’s 
TIF policy. Consider two communities, X and Y. The communities are identical in all 
aspects, except the fiscal package (e.g., tax rate and level of government services) 
provided by a local government. At period t0, each community is comprised of residents 
with identical preferences, but the residents in Community X have different preferences 
from those in Community Y. Now, suppose that a new TIF project is implemented in the 
communities in period t1. The implementation of this new TIF project changes the current 
condition of the communities, which eventually changes the utility of residents.  
Since residents can freely choose the community in which they live by “voting 
with their feet,” some will move to an alternative location if they anticipate that the utility 
to be gained from moving is greater than the current community’s utility level. This can 
be expressed using the following equation: 
Bi = (Ci - C*) - Ri* > (Cj - C*) - Rj*, i ≠ j, 
where Ci and Cj represent the location’s benefits including wages, the probability of 
employment, the natural environment (e.g., climate), and other advantages. C* represents 
the location benefits of the current residential site. Ri* and Rj* represent the costs involved 
 
2 This study is based on several Tiebout Model assumptions, not all. Specifically, (1) residents are perfectly 
mobile. (2) residents have full information, and (3) there are no spillovers among communities.  
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in moving from the current location to the alternative location. Bi equals 0 if the current 
location is optimal for residents.  
For example, Resident A in Community X will move to Community Y if (Cy - C*) 
- Ry* > (Cx - C*) - Rx*. Otherwise, he or she will stay in Community X. Resident B in 
Community Y will also move to Community X if (Cx - C*) - Rx* > (Cy - C*) - Ry*. 
Otherwise, he or she will stay in Community Y.  
However, it is also possible to form a new community rather than choosing 
among the existing ones, if the net benefits expected to be gained from a new community 
with a new TIF project are greater. Consider a hypothetical Resident C in Community X. 
If the implementation of TIF changes their utility, she would consider moving to 
Community Y or creating a new Community Z with a new TIF project.  
(Cz - C*) - Rz* > (Cy - C*) - Ry*, 
where Cz refers to the location benefits for the new Community Z, and Rz* represents the 
costs involved in creating a TIF and moving to Community Z. Assume benefits are 
distributed continuously so that net benefits for Community Z have probability zero of 
being the same as those for Community Y. If there is no difference in the benefits 
expected to be gained from each community, people will choose one of the existing 
communities rather than creating a new one. If (Cz - C*) - Rz* > (Cy - C*) - Ry*, Resident 
C will create a new community with a new TIF project. If (Cy - C*) - Ry* > (Cz - C*) - Rz*, 
they will move to Community Y.  
Hypothesis 2: The adoption of a tax increment financing project in a community 
accelerates the adoption of TIF in other communities.  
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2.9 The Influence of Political Factors in Economic Development Policies  
Two main theories, structure and agency, have competed with each other to 
explain the adoption and extent of economic development policies. This continuing 
debate about economic development policy has led to the development of several 
theoretical and case studies (Kantor, 1988; Wong, 1988). 
First, the basic assumption of structural theory is that social and economic 
conditions determine economic development policies. One of the typical examples of 
structural theory is an economic condition in which a local government heavily depends 
on manufacturing (Fleischmann, Green, & Kwong, 1992). Unemployment and poverty 
rates are also included as components of structural theory; Peterson (1981) argues that 
local governments make an effort to improve these social indicators to maintain their 
socioeconomic position among other governments. Additionally, public officials usually 
feel a great deal of pressure regarding these structural indicators because residents are 
likely to ask them to do something if they face poor local conditions. Thus, structural 
theory argues that socioeconomic indicators are key determinants of the adoption and 
extent of economic development policies.  
 Human agency theory, meanwhile, mainly focuses on specific actors. One 
example of this argument is growth machines theory, which claims that actors who profit 
from community growth play an important role in shaping economic development 
policies (Fleischmann et al., 1992); for instance, politicians, retailers, realtors, and 
mortgage companies are actors who are deeply involved in local development. A related 
aspect of this agency theory is political leadership. Specifically, a mayor-council system 
is more likely to adopt development policies because mayors tend to be more responsive 
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and sensitive than politicians in a council-manager system (Feiock & Clingermayer, 
1986).  
 Previous studies have mainly focused on structural factors such as socioeconomic 
indicators. On the contrary, only a few studies have analyzed the political factors that are 
closely related to economic development policies, even though these factors play 
important roles in shaping policies (Betz et al., 2012). In this sense, this study 
theoretically examines why these political factors are important in this field and how they 
influence the adoption and extent of economic development policies.   
2.9.1 Political Actors 
As discussed above, political actors are closely associated with economic 
development policies. The reason why political actors continuously adopt and use 
incentives is that this decision and behavior are rational. Specifically, the political 
rationality model claims that the adoption and use of economic development policies can 
provide an opportunity for public officials and political actors to appeal to their residents 
(Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001; Sharp, 1991). This policy tool is very useful when elected 
officials want to strengthen their political positions. Similarly, using economic 
development policy is an instrument for credit-claiming (Feiock & Clingermayer, 1986). 
When a local area faces an economic recession or difficulties, elected officials receive 
much pressure from their residents, and constituent groups ask them to do something. In 
this situation, Feiock (1986) suggests that economic development policies are effective 
and politically advantageous to elected officials because they are visible projects. Thus, 
people easily recognize through them that elected officials are doing something for the 
community, regardless of a policy’s true effectiveness.  
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 There may be a question of why local elected officials actively use economic 
development policies even if their effectiveness is uncertain. This behavior is also 
explained by elected officials’ rationality, as it is rational to assume that local elected 
officials mainly focus on their activities’ impact on their local area. In other words, local 
elected officials are not concerned with the zero-sum characteristics of fiscal incentives at 
the state or national level. From their point of view, attracting and inducing investments 
for employment bring them political benefits, and that is enough for them. In this regard, 
this study concludes that elected local officials rationally use economic development 
policies.  
2.9.2 Political System 
There is no doubt that there would be different economic development strategies 
if each local government had significant differences. This general assumption is the same 
for political systems. For instance, Lubell, Feiock, and Ramirez (2005) suggest that the 
form of government is one explanation for the variation in economic development 
policies. Unlike other countries, the U.S. has an especially unusual local government 
system, where local residents can choose their local government structure. Thus, it is 
expected that this difference in government structure influences the adoption and extent 
of economic development policies. Although there are several types of government, 
many previous studies primarily focus on two: the mayor-council and council-manager 
systems.  
 The main difference between these two systems is based on the role of the mayor 
and manager in each system. The mayor-council system is more responsive than the 
council-manager system because the former implies that mayors are more likely to be 
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sensitive to local demands to win the next election compared to managers who work in a 
council-manager system. Although this condition could lead to positive results in local 
areas, such as innovative practices and citizen participation (Nelson & Svara, 2012; Yang 
& Callahan, 2011), the mayor-council system permits the reckless use of fiscal 
incentives.  
On the other hand, city managers in the council-manager system tend to pursue 
professional goals and long-term economic development (Feiock, Jeong, & Kim, 2003). 
This is because managers do not have incentives for elections. In this sense, managers are 
highly likely to deal with economic development policies from a more calculated point of 
view and are expected to constrain the indiscriminate use of fiscal incentives. 
Based on these difference in political systems, this study asserts that there are 
significant variations between these two government structures. The mayor-council 
system may be positively associated with the adoption and extent of economic 
development policies. 
2.9.3 Political Climate and Ideology 
There are two theories that relate to the political climate over economic 
development policies. First, due to fiscal policy interdependence, municipalities and 
states do not make independent policy decisions in isolation. Rather, local governments 
tend to consider and review other governments’ current policies carefully within a system 
of fiscal policy interdependence (Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2003). This indirect fiscal 
policy interdependence also triggers a specific state mood and opinion regarding 
economic development policies. Thus, when local governments make a decision 
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regarding fiscal incentives, there is a possibility that they could be swayed by strong 
public opinion. Second, the yardstick competition theory assumes that there is an 
information externality among local governments (Besley & Case, 1992). Specifically, 
voters who receive imperfect information about other local government policies evaluate 
their current government using this information as a reference point for this information 
and then tend to pressure incumbents accordingly. This information externality thereby 
accelerates fiscal competition among jurisdictions (Besley & Case, 1995; Bordignon, 
Cerniglia, & Revelli, 2003; Ermini & Santolini, 2007; Solé-Ollé, 2003). Finally, this 
information externality forms the basis of strong political pressure for the adoption and 
extent of the use of economic incentives.   
 Additionally, some studies have indicated that political ideology could have an 
influence on economic development policy choices. Generally, Democrats are more 
likely to support government interventions in the economy and are reluctant to create 
benefits for companies without concomitant job creation (Betz et al., 2012). Republicans 
usually take a different position to Democrats on economic development policies. 
Republicans support the notion of helping business, but they do not prefer to help pick 
winners (Betz et al., 2012). A few studies have analyzed the relationship between specific 
fiscal incentives and ideology. Notably, Lewis (2002) found that there is a negative 
relationship between Democratic Party strength and retail development incentives. 
Similarly, Jenkins, Leicht, and Wendt (2006) ascertained that Democratic Party strength 
has a negative impact on industrial recruitment and entrepreneurial strategies. Given the 
current situation, more research is needed because the literature does not offer a clear 
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answer regarding the general relationship between the most frequently used economic 
development policies and ideology.     
 In summary, based on previous studies, we can deduce that political factors play 
an important role in shaping economic development policies, including TIF. Figure 2.2 
provides an implicit view of the importance of political factors. There is a relative lack of 
empirical studies analyzing the relationship between local political factors and fiscal 
incentives compared to such analyses in socioeconomic factor studies.  
 
Figure 2.2 The relationship between determinants and the adoption and extent of the use 
of economic development policies  
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2.10 Theoretical Extensions 
As discussed, most state and local governments adopt economic development 
policies. If we have to describe the current situation, we must first refer to Rubin (1988), 
which states, “Shoot anything that flies; claim anything that falls” (p. 236). Although 
most studies concentrate on the effectiveness of economic development policies, they fail 
to give us clear answers on why. In addition, these studies do not explain why local 
governments structurally and actively use economic policies and why we get mixed 
effectiveness results. This study has attempted to answer these two questions. 
The first model shows that a TIF project contains the characteristics of a zero-sum 
game. In other words, the implementation of TIF may not have positive impacts on the 
local area. This is consistent with some previous literature. However, there are some 
studies that contain opposing arguments (Anderson, 1990; Dardia, 1998; Man & 
Rosentraub, 1998; Wassmer & Anderson, 2001; Yadavalli & Landers, 2017). In this 
regard, further empirical studies are needed to test this proposition. The second model 
implies that each community can be composed of people with homogeneous preferences 
if they reach an equilibrium. If Community Y offers a TIF project that people find 
attractive, then some groups of residents in X (e.g., small business owners, private 
investors, etc.) will respond by moving to an alternative place. At the same time, some 
groups of residents in X and Y could leave their communities because a TIF project in 
Community Y changes their utilities. They are likely to try to cooperate with other people 
to create a new community with a new TIF project that meets their preferences. This 
theoretical logic could explain a considerable portion of the current diffusion of TIF.  
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There is a need for empirical studies to clarify the mechanism of TIF adoption. 
The third part provides a theoretical explanation of how political factors are associated 
with economic development polices. This study found that there is a relative lack of 
research on the political determinants of fiscal incentives because the previous literature 
does not indicate a general relationship, even though political factors play an important 
role in economic development policies. Studies that include political factors in the model 
are therefore needed in this field 
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CHAPTER 3. THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION AND FORMS OF GOVERNMENT ON THE 
UTILIZATION OF BUSINESS INCENTIVES  
 
Abstract 
To analyze the effects of competition and the forms of government on the utilization of 
business incentives at the local government level, this study focuses on two major 
incentives: tax credit and tax increment financing. The statistical results show that the 
competition mechanisms operate differently for each of the incentives. More specifically, 
the council-manager system considerably constrains the overall adoption and extent of 
use of business incentives. These results could indicate the prevalence of a particular 
form of government for economic development policies.  
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3.1 Introduction 
As in most countries, economic development is repeatedly an important and highly 
competitive issue in the United States (U.S.) (Hawkins, 2017). This observation of the 
current situation is supported by the fact that U.S. municipalities commonly offer at least 
one economic development policy to induce business investment. In addition, state and 
local governments have spent large budgetary amounts to offer economic development 
incentives to potential businesses (Wang, 2018). Even the recent economic recession has 
not affected this upward trend. For instance, . In 2017, there was fierce competition 
among the states when Toyota and Mazda revealed that they will build a new plant that 
would be expected to create 4,000 quality jobs (Boudette, 2018). According to latest 
news, over 10 states—among those are Kentucky, Alabama, North Carolina, and 
Michigan—joined the bid to attract the investment. Toyota and Mazda revealed that they 
received incentive packages of at least 1 billion dollars (Boudette, 2018) . This appears to 
be a classic example of competition among state governments in terms of economic 
development policies. The recent Toyota–Mazda case is a typical example of 
competition. However, governments do not always compete against each other in all 
program projects. NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) is an example of such cases. For 
instance, the city of Vancouver planned Rain City housing aimed at providing houses for 
people who suffer from addictions, mental illness, and other challenges. When this 
project was released, many residents were concerned about safety and were therefore 
resisting such changes (Woo, 2012). These extreme cases show that governments and 
residents have different attitudes toward economic development policies, depending on 
the type of development plan and its expected benefits. At the same time, this field is 
facing strong criticism because of the indiscreet behavior of local governments. 
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According to some studies, local governments tend to adopt and use business incentives 
without adopting any specific tactic (Grady, 1987; Wolman, 1988). It seems that offering 
a competitive mechanism for the purpose of maintaining or improving an economic 
position is made largely in spite of strong doubt that economic development policies 
overall are effective. For example, the metaphor of an arms race is used to describe the 
current situation, in which “shopping lists” for policy options almost always favor the 
promotion of the local economy and winning the competition at all costs. This situation is 
similar to the idea of a “race to the bottom” (Buss, 2001; Koven & Lyons, 2006). Given 
these conditions, it is undeniable that having an economic development policy has 
become the agenda that draws the most attention from the financial sector. As the 
popularity of economic development policies has grown, it becomes imperative to 
understand the logic that motivates business incentives.  
Regarding current trends, two problems can arise. There is a strong likelihood that 
when local governments make a decision, they do not carefully consider the unique 
conditions and variations of their particular situation (Fleischmann et al., 1992).  The 
second problem is that there are no widely accepted explanations for variations of 
economic development policies among the municipalities. Although structure and agency 
theories compete with each other, the literature has so far been unable to reach a definite 
conclusion.  
To keep up with the flow, many previous studies have analyzed how local 
governments develop their own features in determining the adoption and extending the 
offer of an economic development incentive (Felix & Hines, 2013). Despite these 
articles, little empirical evidence exists whether or not the use of a business incentive is a 
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purely financial mechanism or the result of competitive behavior. Specifically, to 
estimate the degree to which business incentives are driven by competition, these studies 
simply count the number of questionnaire items about the topic (Warner & Zheng, 2013; 
Zheng & Warner, 2010). Although this method could indirectly measure the level of 
competition, it is difficult to achieve an exact estimate of the competitive level. 
Additionally, the number of business incentive programs is used as an indicator of the 
extent of economic development policies (Green & Fleischmann, 1991; Sharp, 1991; 
Warner & Zheng, 2013). However, none of these approaches reliably measure the extent 
to which incentives are used. One main strand of the literature focuses mainly on the 
adoption of economic development incentives (Feiock, & Clingermayer, 1992; Felix & 
Hines, 2013; Green & Fleischmann, 1991; Zheng & Warner, 2010). These previous 
studies have a definite limitation because it is impossible to analyze the degree to which a 
community’s characteristics have an influence on the use of business incentives.  
To address the limitations of previous studies, this study uses the 2014 
International City/County Management Association (ICMA) Economic Development 
Survey. Previous studies have usually depended on the ICMA surveys of 1999, 2004, and 
2009 to obtain basic information about the business incentives of municipalities. One 
main difference between the 2014 and previous surveys is that the 2014 survey changed 
its questionnaire items. This change enables us to estimate to what extent competition 
influences local government’s decision regarding economic development priorities for 
the adoption and extensive use of business incentives. Thus, it is possible that the 
conclusions of this study could differ from previous studies.  
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 To bridge the literature gap, this study is based on unique data that is distinctive 
from previous data sets. The paper not only includes structure theory variables but also 
adds agency theory variables to compare the degree of effect on the use of business 
incentives. This study differentiates the use of business incentives by two representative 
types: tax credit and tax increment financing (TIF). Accordingly, this paper aims to 
contribute to the field of economic development policy by posing and answering the 
following questions: (1) To what extent, if at all, does competition influence the local 
government’s decision regarding economic development priorities and affect the 
adoption of business incentives? (2) To what extent, if at all, does competition influence 
local government’s decision regarding economic development priorities and affect the 
extensive use of tax credits and TIF? (3) What impact does the form of government have 
on the adoption and extensive use of tax credits and TIF? (4) To what extent, if at all, 
does competition influence local government’s decision regarding economic development 
priorities as concerns the total number of business incentives? Additionally, this study 
analyzes the causal relationship between explanatory variables and the utilization of 
business incentives. A few studies have supported that independent variables, such as 
competition, government structure, and change in political leadership, have a significant 
impact on economic development policies. However, it is difficult to find studies that 
support that economic development policies have an impact on the competition of local 
governments, form of government, and government ideology. In this regard, the main 
purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the causal relationship and not the correlation. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The first section is a brief 
explanation of economic development policy trends and reviews the previous studies 
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about competition for development between municipalities and the general determinants 
of business incentive policies, as well as the foremost theories. The next section presents 
the data and method, and the paper concludes with a summary of the results and a 
discussion of the noteworthy implications.  
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Factors that Affect the Extensive Use of Business Incentives 
Questions have been repeatedly raised about why local governments still use business 
incentives for economic development, given some concern in the field about the 
effectiveness of the policy. Several scholars have tried to answer these questions. For 
instance, political calculation, economic, and fiscal conditions have an impact on the 
adoption of business incentives (Fisher & Peters, 1998; Wolman, 1988). Additionally, 
previous studies point out that inconclusive studies on the effectiveness of incentives 
have led to encouraging the use of such policies among municipalities (Bartik, 2003; 
Lynch, 2004). At the same time, many local governments are still reluctant to offer 
business incentives. This is because local governments take account of the risk of revenue 
loss, doubtful effectiveness, and calculations of profit and loss for such policies (Felix & 
Hines, 2013). Although some governments already know the mixed results of the 
ineffectiveness of business, they continue using incentives because of the footloose 
nature of investment and the widespread popularity of incentives (Bartik, 2005; Lynch, 
2004). In this regard, this paper examines the extent of the effect of competition on the 
decision-making of municipalities regarding economic development priorities; 
specifically, the aim is to determine the effect of the adoption and extensive use of 
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business incentives by comparing incentive users with non-users because few empirical 
studies have analyzed the effect of competition on the adoption and extensive use of 
business incentives. 
Competition 
The interaction of capitalism and federalism has given birth to the phenomenon of a 
common pool in the economic development policy (Berry, 2008; Bowman, 1988). 
Decentralized local governments can freely exploit a shared tax base because federal 
government total tax revenues are not important for local governments (Drucker, 
Funderburg, Merriman, & Weber, 2020). Many local governments also overlap the tax 
base with several jurisdictions at the same time. This local fragmentation and economic 
gap among the municipalities force local governments to continuously compete with each 
other by the use of business incentives. Thus, we can conclude that business incentives, 
including tax credits, aggravate the zero-sum situation because the resources that 
municipalities can gain are limited (Hawkins, 2017).  
 Local governments have two alternatives to overcome the tragedy of a common 
pool and zero-sum situation. One is cooperation and the other is competition to win. 
However, a local government necessarily chooses competitive behavior instead of 
cooperation because the justification for cooperation with other governments will 
diminish if the amounts of benefits or gains cannot be shared equably among other 
governments (Bowman, 1988). In other words, “Competition is said to occur when 
benefits are returned to a subset of the jurisdiction seeking them” (Bowman, 1988, 
p.512). Previous studies have already predicted the inevitable consequence of the 
jurisdictional competition orientation (Stone, 1984). Tiebout (1956) argues that, in 
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theory, a system of a high level of fragmented local government is necessary to achieve 
the optimal level of public service. This fragmentation allows local governments to select 
an almost infinite combination of spending and taxes and give almost perfect information 
to each resident. This theoretical foundation makes it difficult to choose cooperation 
because residents are highly likely to apply considerable pressure on the local 
government to follow other governments’ incentive offers. As a practical consideration, 
municipalities unavoidably choose competitive behavior. The first reason is that the 
almost unlimited mobility of capital leads to the increasing impulse to compete among 
the local governments (Hawkins, 2010). The number of municipalities also makes 
cooperative behavior more difficult because the increasing complexity of relationships 
between local governments results in making cooperation problematic. In this sense, 
competitive behavior of local governments is an inevitable result when we consider the 
given circumstances.  
 Competitive behavior does not necessarily always produce negative results. There 
is an argument that competition can conversely lead to positive results. Specifically, 
according to the public choice theory, competition has a positive impact on 
organizational performance (Boyne, 1996). This competitive ethos compels local 
governments to “do the right things and do things right” (Boyne, 1996, p.704). To the 
contrary, many previous studies indicate that there is a possibility that incentive 
competition can result in threatening the local economy (Ellis & Rogers, 2000; Patrick, 
2014). Additionally, this intense competition for business incentives results in a low 
quality of public service because business incentives can only relocate the business across 
municipalities and not lead to the real change of economic growth (Bartik, 1991; Fisher 
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& Peters, 1997; Wang, 2016). If we assume the extreme case, previous studies raise the 
possibility of border wars (Wang, 2018). Although there is a theoretical argument that 
supports the positive effect of competitive behavior of local governments, the destructive 
aspect of competition among municipalities is generally more persuasive in this field. 
 Many previous studies have analyzed the relationship between competition and 
business incentives and, usually, have found a positive relationship between incentives 
and competition. Zheng and Warner (2010) found that a government is more likely to use 
incentives if it faces intergovernmental competition. According to a study by Felix and 
Hines (2013), a government that is located close to a state border line is more likely to 
adopt a program of business incentives and competition. Green and Fleischmann (1991) 
found that a municipality is more likely to follow other municipalities’ choice of the 
business incentive if the other municipalities are located in the same Census Region. 
Bowman (1988) also found that cities tend to have a competitive ethos and this attitude 
results in aggressive economic development programs. In general, previous studies 
support the idea of a positive relationship between economic development incentives and 
horizontal competition.  
 Despite these previous studies, little direct evidence exists as to the extent to 
which competition influences local government’s decision regarding economic 
development priorities and affects the probability of extensively adopting the use of 
business incentives in a municipality. Unfortunately, previous studies do not clearly 
answer this question. For example, Bowman (1988) focuses only on southeastern cities, 
making  it difficult to generalize the result. When Zheng and Warner (2010) estimate the 
extent of the use of business incentives and the degree of competition, they simply count 
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the average number of business incentives used and address the issue of competition 
among six questionnaire categories. In other words, we cannot know exactly the extent to 
which competition influences local government’s decision regarding economic 
development priorities and the impact it has on the extensive use of business incentives. 
Green and Fleischmann (1991) also use a similar method when they estimate the level of 
competitiveness. In their study, they used the average number of business incentives of a 
number of local governments when they estimated regional competition. Felix and Hines 
(2013) analyze the factors of tax credits, tax abatement, and TIF, but they focus only on 
the probability of adoption, not the extensive use of business incentives.  
 To address these limitations, this paper used a new survey to estimate the extent 
to which competition influences local government’s decision-making regarding economic 
development priorities. By changing the survey method of ICMA, we were able to obtain 
more exact data about the extent to which competition influences local government’s 
decision regarding economic development priorities and the extent of business incentives. 
Specifically, the 2004 and 2009 ICMA surveys of economic development asked the 
survey participants to simply identify a jurisdiction’s competition category and the 
adoption status of business incentives. Structurally, it is not possible to obtain detailed 
information about competition and business incentives. By changing the questionnaire 
methodology, the 2014 ICMA survey offered an opportunity to contribute to the field of 
business incentives. 
 By following and expanding the logic of previous studies, we can easily conclude 
that a positive relationship likely exists between the extent to which competition 
influences local government’s decision regarding economic development priorities and 
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the extensive use of incentives. In line with previous studies, we propose the following 
two hypotheses:  
 Hypothesis 1: As the extent to which competition affects the decision of 
municipalities regarding economic development priorities gets stronger, the 
probability of adopting business incentives is likely to be increased. 
Hypothesis 2: As the extent to which competition affects the decision of 
municipalities regarding economic development priorities gets stronger, the 
extent of business incentives is likely to be increased.  
3.2.2 Theoretical Perspective of the Use of an Economic Development Policy 
Generally, there are two meaningful features that affect the use of business 
incentives in the community. The first character is the degree of proximity of other states 
(Felix & Hines, 2013). If a community is close to other states, this fact may increase the 
level of competitiveness of the environment. As a result, the community is more likely to 
adopt or use business incentives. The second feature is related to the political culture. 
Troubled political cultures lead to the greater likelihood that business incentives will be 
offered (Felix & Hines, 2013). In this paper, the concept of a troubled culture is estimated 
by the corruption rate of a state. Apart from these general explanations, there are several 
perspectives that theoretically explain the adoption and use of economic development 
policies.  
 The political rationality model explains that economic development initiatives 
offer local political actors an opportunity to appeal to their constituent groups 
(Clingermayer & Feiock, 2001; Sharp, 1991; Wolman & Spitzley, 1996). This distinctive 
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feature of business incentives enables elected officials to strengthen their policy support 
by using the visible function of business incentives as a reward for political support. For 
example, the popularity of a mayor and elected officials is closely related to their 
administration’s economic development policy (Bowman, 1988). By slightly expanding 
the findings of previous studies, we anticipate that the structure and form of government 
has a relationship with the extensive use of business incentives. The previous studies 
already show the possibility of a close relationship between government structure and 
incentives. Several studies have found that the form of government has an impact on 
innovative practices, citizen participation, and economic development policies (Nelson & 
Svara, 2012; Sharp, 1991; Yang & Callahan, 2011). If we fully understand the 
differences between typical government structures, such as the mayor-council and 
council-manager systems, we can infer the relationship. Basically, the mayor-council 
system is evaluated as being a more responsive system than the manager-council system 
because the mayor-council system is based on short-term electoral incentives (Lyons, 
1978). Although this incentive could lead to positive outcomes, such as organizational 
innovation (Williamson, 1988), the mayor-council system can lead to the reckless pursuit 
of visible programs that usually increase the financial burden. On the other hand, because 
managers in the council-manager system pursue long-term strategies and professional 
goals, the council-manager system has institutional strategies and devices to preclude 
political opportunism. When choosing a manager, the degree of the manager candidate’s 
professionalism is a key criterion. Such professionalism is evaluated by the experience, 
education, and membership of professional associations (Zhang & Feiock, 2009). In this 
sense, it is reasonable to assume that the council-manager system tends to use business 
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incentives less compared to the mayor-council system. Other researchers indirectly 
support this idea that the council-manager system results in less local spending and 
taxation (Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Stumm & Corrigan, 1998). On this basis, the next 
hypothesis follows:  
Hypothesis 3: The council-manager system is negatively associated with the 
adoption of business incentives.  
Hypothesis 4: The council-manager system is negatively associated with the 
extent of use of business incentives.  
 
 There has been a continuous debate over which theory has more explanatory 
power in terms of business incentives. The representative debate is that of structure 
versus agency, and this dispute has led to several case studies (Kantor, 1988; Wong, 
1988). The basic logic of structural theory is that economic and social conditions 
determine a city’s economic development policies. This theory has something in common 
with the City Limits theory of Peterson (1981). According to Peterson’s theory, local 
government is similar to private firms because municipalities compete against each other 
to enhance their economic position and social prestige (Fleischmann et al., 1992). This 
competition forces public officials to pay close attention to social and economic 
indicators, such as unemployment and poverty rates. Local public officials naturally feel 
pressure to do something to attract new investment to maintain or improve the current 
economic position (Fleischmann et al., 1992).  In other words, structural theory claims 
68 
 
that a city’s social and economic conditions are factors influencing the use of business 
incentives.  
On the contrary, human agency theory argues that specific actors are the key 
factors affecting local development policy. This theory naturally links to the growth 
machine theory. This theory explains that local elite groups, which include politicians, 
the media, and companies, have driven the city’s economic growth. Thus, human agency 
theory concludes that a changing political leadership and coalition building play an 
important role in shaping economic development policies because they usually put a high 
value on economic growth through development policies.  
 Strategic interaction with other local governments is also associated with the 
adoption and extensive use of business incentives. For example, if a local government 
adopts a TIF program, this has an impact on the decisions of other local governments. 
Byrne (2005) found that strategic interaction acts as an important mechanism when 
municipalities adopt TIF programs. Business incentives are intended to operate as 
competitive levers. A certain degree of fiscal policy interdependence has been identified 
by previous studies as explaining mutual interaction among municipalities (Brueckner, 
2003; Revelli, 2005). Specifically, municipalities are reluctant to independently select a 
fiscal policy and check the choices of other, neighboring governments. Case, Rosen, and 
Hines (1993) found that per capita expenditure of state government is statistically 
positively associated with neighboring state governments. This fiscal policy interaction is 
also influenced by the yardstick of political competition. Municipal residents, who 
usually have imperfect information about other governments, tend to impose political 
pressure on their local leaders to ask the government to follow or imitate the policy status 
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of neighboring governments. This mechanism is supported by previous studies (Besley & 
Case, 1995; Ermini & Santolini, 2007; Ollé, 2003), which offer an abundance of 
theoretical explanations for the adoption and use of economic development policies. 
3.2.3 Practical Perspective on the Use of Economic Development Policies 
Many previous studies that have analyzed economic development policy have 
also been conducted according to a practical social index to explain the mechanisms 
involved. A well-known argument addresses the effect a city’s wealth condition has on 
the use of business incentives. According to a few studies, business incentives are more 
likely to be used if a city is prospering (Reese, 1991; Rubin, 1988). These conclusions 
have attracted a lot of counterarguments. Conversely, a city under severe fiscal stress is 
more likely to offer business development incentives (Feiock & Clingermayer, 1992; 
Felix & Hines, 2013). For example, the unemployment rate is used as a proxy for the 
fiscal stress of a municipality. A higher unemployment rate is positively associated with 
an incentive package (Fisher & Peters, 1997). Wang (2018) found that a rising 
unemployment rate leads to increasing economic development incentive spending. Man 
(1999) found that there is more adoption of TIF if a community has a lower income level, 
while a higher personal income is negatively related with spending on economic 
development incentives (Wang, 2018). The manufacturing share of employment is also 
used as an indicator of economic distress. Fleischmann et al. (1992) found no significant 
relationship between the percentage of jobs in manufacturing and economic development 
policies. Wang (2018) found the same result about the manufacturing share of 
employment. Overall, the literature supports the idea that conditions of economic distress 
lead to more adoption and use of economic development incentives.  
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 A municipality’s demographic characteristics have an impact on economic 
development incentives. One such representative indicator is population size and city 
size. For instance, larger cities are more likely to offer businesses incentive programs 
because they tend to have more resources and be under greater pressure (Cook & Beck 
1991; Friedman, 1990). This trend is also confirmed by recent studies. Felix and Hines 
(2013) found that a greater population is significantly associated with offering tax 
incentives. More detailed demographic information is also used in studies. Rork (2003) 
argues that the size of the elderly population could affect the economic development 
incentives because elderly people are more active voters than young people.  
 Additionally, several general complementary reasons explain why local 
governments actively engage in business incentive programs (Wolman & Spitzley, 1996). 
First, the increased mobility of capital contributes to increasing the competition among 
governments at the same level and expanding the use of business incentives (Clarke & 
Gaile, 1989). Second, slow economic growth could have an influence on business 
incentive policy because a declining economic situation results in more pressure to do 
something for residents with economic difficulties (Wolman & Spitzley, 1996). This 
pattern is also confirmed by the recent economic recession. Warner and Zheng (2013) 
found that local governments tend to respond to recession through the use of business 
incentives. Third, economic restructuring could lead to increasing the number of 
economic development programs. For example, if a municipality has a higher level of 
manufacturing employment, the municipality is more likely to adopt a development 
program. Lastly, Clarke and Gaile (1989) point out that decreasing federal government 
assistance may be one reason for increasing business programs. Although many 
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explanations exist for explaining the use of business incentives, only a few studies have 
analyzed the impact that economic and social factors have on the extensive use of 
business incentives.  
3.3 Data 
This study is based on the 2014 survey of municipality economic development 
trends conducted by ICMA. This survey was sent to 5,237 county and city-type 
governments in June 2014. Among local governments, 1,201 participated in this survey 
and the response rate was 23%. Like previous surveys, chief municipal administrative 
officers responded to this one. The ICMA survey estimated a variety of business 
incentives—16 components in all. For example, zoning assistance, utility reductions, and 
regulatory flexibility are included in this category. The average number of business 
incentives used is approximately eight. This paper limits the scope of subject to tax 
credits and TIF because these two business incentives are widely accepted, and research 
has been actively conducted on these two topics. The changed style of questionnaire 
allowed us to estimate the extent of the use of tax credits and TIF. This is one of the main 
differences with previous studies.  
 To analyze which factors determine or motivate the adoption of business 
incentives and the extent of the use of business incentives, this study includes motivated 
economic development priorities. This category includes competition and political 
leadership. Due to the new style survey, this study can measure the extent to which 
competition has an impact on the decision-making of municipalities regarding economic 
development priorities. This survey also asked municipalities the number of barriers that 
impede the use of business incentives among municipalities. The average level of 
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economic development barriers is calculated by the average level of a total of 21 barriers. 
The scale of barriers is coded as follows: 1 = “None,” 2 = “Low,” 3 = “Medium,” and 4 = 
“High.” As shown in descriptive table 3.1, the average level of barriers is about 2.19, 
which is between low and medium level. Additionally, the form of government and 
barriers faced is also added as a factor of business incentives. To address the issue of 
endogeneity, lagged social and economic condition variables were derived from 5-year 
estimates of the 2011 American Community Survey. Lastly, the paper used the 2012 
Government Finance Database (Pierson, Hand, & Thompson, 2015) for local government 
financial data. Although the survey sample starts from 1200 municipalities, this study 
was able to use approximately 700 municipalities in the final dataset after matching 
socioeconomic and financial data: general fund balance, per capita general total revenue, 
and total outstanding debt. 
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics  
Variable  Mean  SD  Min  Max 
 Tax credit1 (Binary) .54 .5 0 1 
 Tax credit2 (Ordered) 1.87 .97 1 4 
 TIF (Binary) .62 .49 0 1 
 TIF (Ordered) 2.26 1.17 1 4 
 Total number of business incentives (of 16) 8.44 3.66 0 16 
 Increased competition 2.81 .92 1 4 
Unemployment rate 8.58 3.44 1.7 29.5 
 Poverty rate 13.09 7.82 1.8 45.9 
% of manufacturing employment 14.24 7.53 1.05 50.34 
 Median family income (log) 10.9 .37 9.84 12.25 
 Form of government .77 .42 0 1 
 Change in political leadership .76 .43 0 1 
 Average level of economic development 
barriers 
2.19 .43 1 3.33 
 Per capita total revenue 1.87 1.24 .25 10.86 
 General fund balance 1.05 .21 .48 3.28 
 Total debt (% of total revenues) 1.24 1.51 0 24.09 
 Population (log) 10.46 .89 8.07 14.2 
 Bachelor’s degree or higher (%) 31.02 15.63 3.1 87.9 
The average level of use incentives 1.86 0.67 0 3.5 
 Sample size 694    
Note: Tax credit1: 1 = Use, 0 = No use; Tax credit2: 1 = No use, 2 = Low, 3 = Medium, 4 = High; TIF1: 1 
= Use, 0 = No use; TIF2: 1 = No use, 2 = Low, 3 = Medium, 4 = High; Increased competition: 1 = No 
motivation, 2 = Minimal motivation, 3 = Moderate motivation, 4 = Significant motivation; Form of 
government: 1: Council-manager, 0: Mayor-council; Change in political leadership: 1 = Motivation, 0 = No 
motivation; Average level of economic development barriers: 1 = None; 2 = Low; 3 = Medium; 4 = High. 
 
3.4 Model 
One frequently asked question concerns which of the variations among 
municipalities have had an influence on the adoption and extent of the use of economic 
development incentives. Previous studies in the literature have made and tested diverse 
hypotheses to identify and analyze the factors of business incentives. The purpose of this 
study is also aimed at understanding the logic of business incentives. Specifically, this 
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paper seeks to determine whether the driving factors of incentives are different depending 
on business incentive type or not and if the adoption or use of incentives by 
municipalities can be differentiated from non-adopting local governments. First, logit 
analysis is used to analyze the effect of explanatory variables on the utilization of tax 
credit and TIF. As Wooldridge (2013) suggests, we can change the logit coefficients to 
probability changes. The average partial effect is used for this analysis. Second, this study 
uses the ordered probit model because the dependent variables are ordinal. Third, a 
negative binominal model is used because the total number of business incentives is a 
non-negative integer with a count value. Although we can use the Poisson regression 
model as a count model, this study uses a negative binomial model because the Poisson 
model operates under the assumption that the variable is equally dispersed (Zheng & 
Warner, 2010). In this case, the total number of business incentives to be counted is 
overdispersed (tendency to 0 and large values). Thus, the negative binomial model is 
more appropriate than the Poisson model. 
 The dependent variables of this study are tax credits, TIF, and total number of 
business incentives. To compare the non-adoption and adoption groups, this study creates 
two dummy variables for tax credit and TIF. We then code the extent of use of tax credit 
and TIF as follows: 1= “No use,” 2 = “Low,” 3 = “Medium,” and 4 = “High.” Figure 1 
shows the detailed information on the use of business incentives. Lastly, we count the 
total number of business incentives to estimate the extent of the use of business 
incentives as another proxy. The paper measures the degree of adoption of incentives and 
uses it with the following independent variables derived from previous studies. As 
mentioned above, the variables listed in the literature include competition, socioeconomic 
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condition, political leadership, form of government, and financial conditions. Detailed 
information for each variable is presented below.  
 
Figure 3.1 Tax credit and tax increment financing use, U.S. municipalities, 2014 
Competition 
 
Earlier studies have shown that local governments are facing intense competition 
with other governments. We confirm that this competitive behavior has an influence on 
overall economic development incentives. Structurally, municipalities cannot easily 
cooperate with each other because the context of economic development contains the 
characteristics of a zero-sum game. Based on this fact, this study constructed the 
hypotheses in a previous section. We predict that there is more probability of the 
adoption and extensive use of business incentives if the extent to which competition has 
an impact on the decision-making of municipalities regarding economic development 
46.40%
27.23%
18.88%
7.49%
38.18%
18.30%
22.48%
21.04%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
No use Low use Medium use High use
Use of Business Incentives (n = 694)
Tax credit TIF
76 
 
priorities is stronger. The variable is coded as follows: 1 = “No motivation,” 2 = 
“Minimal motivation,” 3 = “Moderate motivation,” and 4 = “Significant motivation.”  
Socioeconomic and Demographic Conditions 
A business incentive is usually designed with the purpose of expanding the tax 
base and increasing job creation. Based on the goals described by various policies and 
studies in the literature, we expect that higher rates of poverty and unemployment lead to 
heavier use by local governments. Recently, the manufacturing share of employment is 
recognized as an indicator of economic distress. Thus, we anticipate that there may be a 
positive association between the percentage of jobs in manufacturing and business 
incentives. It is also expected that median family income may be negatively associated 
with business incentives. In line with the literature, a higher population may be more 
likely to increase the use of business incentives. Lastly, the percentage of bachelor’s or 
higher degrees is included as an additional environmental context.  
3.4.1 Political Reasons and Government Structure 
This study also analyzes whether changes in political leadership influence a local 
government’s decision regarding economic development priorities and thus affect the 
adoption and extent of business incentives. Human agency theory suggests that a specific 
actor can determine the direction of business incentives. In other words, changing the 
political leadership can lead to a higher use of business incentives. If a significant change 
in the political leadership of a local government has more of an impact on the decision-
making processes of municipalities regarding economic development priorities, then we 
expect that there is a higher probability of the adoption and extensive use of business 
incentives. Additionally, we raise the possibility that the council-manager system is likely 
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to constrain the use of business incentives because the manager in the council-manager 
system is likely to pursue a more long-term perspective.  
3.4.2 Economic Development Barriers 
We anticipate governments that have more barriers to economic development will 
be less likely to adopt and use business incentives. For example, a local government 
could not easily obtain momentum if the government is facing strong citizen opposition 
to economic development. In this regard, a higher level of barriers to economic 
development leads to the less adoption and use of business incentives. In 2014, the top 
three barriers were cost of land, lack of capital/funding, and lack of buildings. 
3.4.3 Fiscal Condition 
We use per capital total revenue, general fund balance, and the ratio of total 
outstanding debt to total revenue to control the fiscal conditions of local government. The 
per capita total revenue indicates budgetary solvency (Gorina, Maher, & Joffe, 2018). 
General fund balance is an indicator of cash solvency; thus, it is expected that there is a 
positive relationship with the extent of use of business incentives. Debt as a share of total 
revenue shows the level of the long-term solvency of local government (Gorina, Maher, 
& Joffe, 2018), suggesting a negative association with the extent of use of business 
incentives. 
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3.5 Model Results 
The first results test the effects of increased competition and the form of 
government on the use of tax credit incentives and TIF. The results are presented in Table 
3.2 Column 1 including only tax credits, measured by binary variables, and Column 2 
including TIF as binary dependent variables. As shown in Column 1, the council-
manager system is 7.8% less likely than the mayor-council system to incentivize tax 
credits. This result supports hypothesis 3. As the extent to which changes in political 
leadership impacting the decision-making of municipalities regarding economic 
development priorities gets stronger, the probability of tax credits being adopted is likely 
to be increased. This result supports the human agency theory. As we expected, the 
average level of economic development barriers has a negative impact on the 
implementation of the tax credit policy. Consistent with previous studies, population size 
increases the implementation of the tax credit policy. Column 2 in Table 3.2 shows that 
as the extent to which competition affects the decision of municipalities regarding 
economic development priorities gets stronger, the probability of adopting TIF is likely to 
be increased. In contrast to the case of the tax credit system, increased competition 
increases the adoption of TIF. Although unemployment, poverty rates, and median family 
income decrease the adoption of TIF, the manufacturing employment rate increases the 
adoption of TIF.  The negative effects of poverty and unemployment rates are not 
consistent with previous findings in the literature. In fact, the council-manager system is 
11.1% less likely than the mayor-council system to adopt TIF. This result also supports 
the hypothesis. 
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Table 3.2 Logistic regression: Effects of increased competition and the form of 
government on the adoption of tax credit policies and TIF. 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Tax credit 
(Binary) 
TIF  
(Binary) 
 
   
Increased competition -0.006 0.037* 
 (0.020) (0.020) 
Unemployment rate -0.008 -0.015** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Poverty rate 0.002 -0.009* 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
% of manufacturing employment 0.003 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Median family income (log) -0.204 -0.533*** 
 (0.138) (0.133) 
Form of government -0.078* -0.111** 
 (0.045) (0.046) 
Change in political leadership 0.095** 0.009 
 (0.042) (0.043) 
Average level of economic development barriers -0.110** -0.058 
 (0.045) (0.045) 
Per capita total revenue 0.027* -0.014 
 (0.016) (0.015) 
General fund balance -0.057 -0.080 
 (0.091) (0.090) 
Total debt(% of total revenues) 0.010 0.016 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
Population (log) 0.116*** 0.029 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%) -0.004* 0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 694 694 
   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Second, the maximum likelihood estimation does not directly show the magnitude 
of the effects. Thus, this study uses marginal effects for interpretation. Table 3.3 presents 
the marginal effects of the variables on the extent to which tax credits are used. This table 
enables us to interpret the magnitude of the impact of both increased competition and the 
form of government, holding other variables at mean values. For example, a local 
government experienced a 10% increase in the probability of not using tax credits, 
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whereas it experienced a 3% decrease in the probability of high use of tax credits as the 
governments converted their forms from mayor-council to council-manager, with other 
variables being held at their mean values. Increased competition does not have a 
statistically significant association with the extent of use of tax credits. A local 
government with a population that is 1% above average has 11% decreased probability of 
choosing “No Use,” and 5%  and 3% increased probability of choosing “Medium Use” 
and “High Use,” respectively. Additionally, as the extent to which a change in the 
political leadership of a local government has an impact on the decision-making of 
municipalities regarding economic development priorities, a municipality experiences a 
7% decrease in the probability of choosing “No Use,” but it experiences a 3% increase in 
the probability of choosing “Medium Use”.  
 
Table 3.3 Marginal effects of variables on the extent of use of tax credit  
 
No Use 
 
Low Use 
 
Medium 
Use 
High Use VARIABLES 
Increased competition -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Unemployment rate 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Poverty rate 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
% of manufacturing employment -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Median family income(log) 0.34** -0.07** -0.17** -0.10** 
Form of government 0.10** -0.02** -0.05** -0.03** 
Change in political leadership -0.07* 0.01 0.03* 0.02 
Average level of economic 
development barriers 
0.09** -0.02** -0.05** -0.03** 
Per capita total revenue -0.03* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01* 
General fund balance 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
Total debt(% of total revenues) -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Population (log) -0.11*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%) 0.00* -0.00 -0.00* -0.00* 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Rows might not add up to 0 owing to rounding. 
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Table 3.4 presents the marginal effects of variables on the extent of use of TIF. 
Unlike the case with tax credits, as the level of competition increases by one level, the 
probability of choosing “No Use” decreases by 5%, while the probability of choosing 
“Medium Use” and “High Use” increases by 1% and 3%, respectively. Table 3.4 also 
shows the marginal effects of other variables while holding other variables at mean 
values. Specifically, a municipality with an unemployment rate 1% above the average 
unemployment rate has 2% increased probability of choosing “No Use,” and a 1% 
decrease in probability of choosing “Medium Use” as well as a 1% decrease for “High 
Use.” This result is different from those of previous studies. More specifically, previous 
studies suggest that economic distress leads to more extensive use of economic 
development incentives. This study also found that a municipality experiences a 13% 
decrease in the probability of choosing “No Use” if the government is mayor-council as 
opposed to council manager with a 9% increase in the probability of choosing “High 
Use.” This result supports the general idea of the effect of government structure.   
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Table 3.4 Marginal effects of variables on the extent of use of TIF 
 
No Use 
 
Low Use 
 
Medium Use High Use VARIABLES 
Increased competition -0.05** -0.00 0.01** 0.03** 
Unemployment rate 0.02*** 0.00 -0.01** -0.01*** 
Poverty rate 0.01* 0.00 -0.00* -0.01* 
% of manufacturing employment 0.01* -0.00 0.00** 0.00** 
Median family income(log) 0.50*** 0.02 -0.15*** -0.37*** 
Form of government 0.13*** 0.00 -0.04*** -0.09*** 
Change in political leadership 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
Average level of economic 
development barriers 
0.08** 0.00 -0.03** -0.06** 
Per capita total revenue 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
General fund balance 0.11 0.00 -0.04 -0.08 
Total debt(% of total revenues) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
Population (log) -0.03 -0.00 0.01 0.02 
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%) 0.00* -0.00 0.00* 0.00* 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Rows might not add up to 0.0 owing to rounding. 
 
Table 3.5 shows the predicted marginal values converted from the negative 
binomial regression model for the total number of business incentives in a municipality. 
As shown in Table 3.5, as increased competition is boosted by one level, the total number 
of business incentives increases by 0.53 while controlling for all other variables. As the 
share of manufacturing employment increases by 1%, the total number of business 
incentives increases by 0.06. This study found that the form of government does not have 
an association with the total number of business incentives. In fact, it is actually per 
capita total revenue and population size that have a positive impact on the total number of 
business incentives.  
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Table 3.5 Model result (Predicted Marginal Values) for total number of business 
incentives 
 Total number of business 
incentives VARIABLES 
Increased competition 0.53*** 
 (0.14) 
Unemployment rate -0.04 
 (0.05) 
Poverty rate -0.02 
 (0.04) 
% of manufacturing employment 0.06*** 
 (0.02) 
Median family income(log) -4.23*** 
 (1.03) 
Form of government 0.06 
 (0.32) 
Change in political leadership 0.43 
 (0.30) 
Average level of economic development barriers 0.34 
 (0.31) 
Per capita total revenue 0.20** 
 (0.10) 
General fund balance -1.42* 
 (0.75) 
Total debt(% of total revenues) 0.12 
 (0.09) 
Population (log) 0.96*** 
 (0.14) 
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%) -0.01 
 (0.01) 
Note. Marginal value derived from the negative binomial model. Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Lastly, this study used the average level of business incentive use because the 
total number of business incentives is just an arithmetic quantity and fails to express the 
degree of use of business incentives. To obtain the average level of business incentive 
use, the average of a total of 16 incentives was calculated. For example, enterprise zones, 
training support, and one-stop permit issuance were included. The scale of the barriers 
was coded as follows: 1 = “No use,” 2 = “Low,” 3 = “Medium,” and 4 = “High.” The 
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average level of business incentive use was about 1.85, which is between the low and 
medium levels. Table 3.6 shows that increased competition has a statistically significant 
impact on the overall average level of business incentive use. This result supports the 
findings of previous studies on the effect of competition among local governments. 
Additionally, the percentage of manufacturing employment and population had a positive 
impact on the average level of business incentive use. This result also supports the 
findings of previous studies. However, other variables, such as the form of government 
and changes in political leadership, did not have a statistically significant impact on the 
average level of business incentive use.   
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Table 3.6 Model result for the average level of business incentive uses 
 The average level of use 
of business incentives VARIABLES 
Increased competition 0.08*** 
 (0.03) 
Unemployment rate -0.02 
 (0.01) 
Poverty rate 0.01 
 (0.01) 
% of manufacturing employment 0.01*** 
 (0.00) 
Median family income(log) -0.36* 
 (0.19) 
Form of government 0.01 
 (0.06) 
Change in political leadership 0.03 
 (0.06) 
Average level of economic development barriers -0.08 
 (0.06) 
Per capita total revenue 0.02 
 (0.10) 
General fund balance -0.12 
 (0.10) 
Total debt(% of total revenues) 0.01 
 (0.02) 
Population (log) 0.11*** 
 (0.03) 
Bachelor’s degree or higher (%) 0.00 
 (0.00) 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
This study has analyzed a unique data set that enables us to estimate the degree to 
which a local government’s features influence the adoption and use of business 
incentives. This study focuses on determining what factors differentiate the 
municipalities that promote business incentives from those that do not. This study found 
that as the extent to which competition affecting the decision of municipalities regarding 
economic development priorities gets stronger, the probability of introducing TIF is 
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likely to increase. However, increased competition does not have a statistically 
significant association with the implementation of tax credit policies. This could be 
evidence that the competition mechanism is inconsistently influencing the 
implementation of economic development policy. Human agency theory is partially 
supported by these findings because a change in political leadership has only a 
statistically positive impact on the introduction of tax credit incentives. Furthermore, the 
effect of the form of government on the implementation of business incentives shows 
consistent results. Those in a council-manager system are less likely than those in a 
mayor-council system to utilize tax credit incentives and TIF. This result supports the 
idea that the council-manager system constrains short-term interest that favors economic 
development policies (Feiock et al., 2003).   
The distinctive data enables us to analyze the marginal effect of variables on the 
extent of use of business incentives. This study found that the effect of increased 
competition could be different depending on the type of incentive. Specifically, as the 
extent to which competition affects the decision of municipalities regarding economic 
development priorities gets stronger, the utilization of TIF is likely to increase. However, 
this competition mechanism shows different results in terms of the use of tax credit 
incentives. As expected, the average level of economic barriers has a negative impact on 
the extent of use of business incentives. This study could not provide clear evidence of 
the effects of economic distress on the extent to which business incentives are used.   
 If we limit the scope of the dependent variable to account for the total number of 
business incentives, the results are different. The form of government does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the total number of business incentives. As the extent to 
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which competition affects the decision of municipalities regarding economic 
development priorities increases by one level, the total number of business incentive uses 
increases. This means that the competition mechanism has a positive association with the 
total number of business incentives that are used.  
To sum up the main findings, this study suggests that the effects of the 
competition mechanism could be different depending on the type of incentive that is 
considered. The council-manager system constrains the overall adoption and extent of use 
of economic development policies. Only few studies have been conducted on the 
adoption and extent of use of incentives; likewise, very few have analyzed the effects of 
the form of government on business incentives. Using unique data on economic 
development policies, this study could contribute to the development of a more nuanced 
logic of business incentives use among local governments.   
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CHAPTER 4. WHY DO STATE GOVERNMENTS OFTEN USE TAX-BASED INCENTIVES? 
 
 
Abstract 
To determine why local governments often use tax-based incentives, this study focuses 
on five major tax-based incentives: job creation tax credits, investment tax credits, R&D 
credits, property tax abatements, and customized job training subsidies. The statistical 
results indicate that a state government’s prevailing political ideology influences the 
choice of economic development activities. Accordingly, a more liberal state may be 
more likely to discourage property tax abatements and customized job-training subsidies 
and encourage job creation tax credits. Additionally, the competition mechanism does not 
operate as a trigger for tax-based incentives. This study also finds that state economic 
conditions are inversely related to the use of incentives. This result could imply the 
prevalence of political factors in the use of incentives. 
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4.1 An Initial Statement of the Policy Issue of Interest  
Many state and local governments in the United States offer incentives to attract 
businesses to their cities. For instance, Amazon's search for a location for its second 
headquarters recently created a bidding war worth millions or even billions of dollars. 
Wisconsin promised to provide $3 billion in incentives to Foxconn in exchange for a TV 
factory, and New Jersey offered $5 billion to entice Amazon (Porter, 2018). These types 
of incentives have a long history, but competition seems to be heating up among state and 
local governments. The number of state business-incentive programs has more than 
doubled from less than 1,000 in 1999 to nearly 2,000 in 2015 (Council for Community 
and Economic Research (CCER), 2015). Thomas (2000) estimated conservatively that 
total state and local expenditures on economic-development incentives totaled around 
$48.8 billion in 1996, and Peters and Fisher (2004) similarly estimated them at around 
$50 billion. While facing high unemployment rates and dwindling state tax revenue 
during the recovery from the Great Recession, local governments increasingly have been 
engaging in economic-development policy to boost their economies. To achieve their 
objectives, policy makers, for example, may designate industrial parks or invest in 
infrastructure, among many potential policy alternatives.  
Although a vast body of literature on tax-incentive policies already exists, these 
studies do not provide clear answers about the efficacy of policy (Bartik, 1991; Goetz et 
al., 2011; Patrick, 2014). This raises the question of why state and local governments 
actively use tax-based incentives despite a lack of supporting evidence. Although recent 
studies have analyzed the factors tied to local tax-based policy at the city and county 
levels (Basolo & Huang, 2001; Dewees, Lobao, & Swanson, 2003; Lewis, 2002; Lobao 
& Kraybill, 2005; Reese, 2006), few studies have analyzed tax-based incentives at the 
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state level, at which the available data is limited, even though the influence of state 
governments continues to increase and many tax-based incentives have been provided by 
state governments for a long time (Carlton, 1983). The role of state governments has 
become crucial because the discretion and responsibility for many federal public 
programs has shifted to state governments, starting with the Reagan administration 
(Heinrich, 2002). Economic development policy has followed the same pattern, and, in 
this sense, more state-level studies are needed. 
 The determinants of previous studies have mainly included socioeconomics, 
fiscal forces, and demographic factors (Reese, 2006). In other words, there has been little 
attention paid to political factors on the use of tax-based incentives. To bridge the 
literature gap, this study focuses on the state level and uses comprehensive tax-based 
data. The paper expands the scope of the subjects of study to include 32 states and five 
widely used tax-based incentives. The characteristics of the study could differentiate 
between previous studies that only focused on specific areas and single incentives. In 
addition, this study includes government ideology to analyze the effects of politics on 
economic development policies. Accordingly, this paper aims to contribute to the field of 
tax-based incentives by positing the following research questions: (1) What are the 
primary factors that increase the use of tax-based incentives by state governments? (2) 
What is the impact of the socioeconomic factors, government capacity, politics, 
neighboring states and industrial composition of states on the use of tax incentives?  
The results suggest that the use of tax-based incentives varies by the type of 
incentive. Generally, the strength of liberalism in a state plays an important role in the 
overall use of incentives. This result could partially explain why state governments use 
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incentives despite the lack of supporting evidence. Economically poor state governments 
tend to resist offering customized job training subsidies but are likely to increase the use 
of investment tax credits. The neighbor effect does not operate as a trigger for the use of 
tax-based incentives. The percentage of manufacturing employment has a negative 
impact on the use of two incentives, which is somewhat surprising given the condition of 
manufacturing industry.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The first section comprises a 
brief explanation of tax incentives and reviews the literature concerning the determinants 
of economic-incentive policy decisions, as well as the foremost theories. The subsequent 
section describes the data and methods, and the study concludes with the results and a 
discussion of noteworthy findings. 
4.2 Literature Review  
4.2.1 Determinants of Tax-Based Incentives  
As many governmental functions, including economic-growth initiatives, have 
been decentralized to local governments since the 1980s, local governments have been at 
the forefront of crafting major local economic-development policy that aims to meet the 
locality’s needs and improve its economic status (Lobao & Kraybill, 2005). Therefore, 
the primary interest of the literature centers around the efficacy of financial incentive 
programs. However, literature exists that has investigated whether a broad range of 
demographic, economic, geographical, industrial, and political factors affects the 
motivation of local governments concerning financial-incentive programs (Basolo & 
Huang, 2001; Sullivan, 2002; Dewees et al., 2003; Fleischmann, Green, & Kwong, 1991; 
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Goetz et al., 2011; Lobao & Kraybill, 2009; Laura A. Reese, 2006; Scott L. Minkoff, 
2009). Scholars have examined variations in the conditions under which local 
governments are willing or able to adopt different policies, although their views diverge 
in explaining the variation, with some citing economic and political structure and others 
citing actions tied to local political and economic actors (Fleischmann et al., 1991). The 
structural explanation assumes that social and economic factors – including the location 
and size of a community, median household income, poverty, and other factors – make it 
difficult for public officials to determine whether to adopt economic-incentive policies. 
On the other hand, literature that emphasizes the actions of local political and economic 
actors points toward the importance of leadership, coalition building, organization, 
political influence, and similar elements in the local policy process (Fleischmann et al., 
1991). As many studies suggest, a broad range of economic and political factors also 
influences a state’s motivations for turning to financial-incentive programs. Also, the 
Council for Community and Economic Research (CCER, 2015) documents that states 
launch more business-incentive programs in response to national recessions and after 
major state elections, especially those involving big political shifts. A substantial portion 
of recent incentive programs created over the past few years has included capital-access 
programs, mainly due to the inception of the State Small Business Credit Initiative of the 
U.S. Treasury Department. Following the Great Recession of 2007-09 and the state 
elections of 2010, which brought 27 new governors to power, states enacted almost 100 
new incentive programs in 2011 (CCER, 2015).  
Socioeconomic Factors 
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According to Peterson (1981), ‘city limit theory’ emphasizes economic principles 
that make communities compete with each other to retain or attract investment and 
capital (Deslatte, 2015). Local governments seek to promote their own interests, such as 
making their communities robust and healthy or increasing tax revenue. This economics-
based theory is built on the belief that decisions of cities are made using principles 
designed to raise public utility and the desire to achieve a strong economic position 
among competing localities. However, such interest-seeking behavior is limited by a 
concern that people and businesses may move out of their communities if a tax rate is too 
high or the quality of public services is low compared with adjacent or competing 
neighborhoods. The competition effect and the pressure of constituents may force policy 
makers to offer economic incentives excessively, leading, in turn, to an economic arms 
race. In this sense, this theory explains why a tax-based policy is popular and often is 
overused. To put it simply, local officials have little knowledge of the authentic needs 
and desires of the residents or businesses that they wish to attract. Because of this 
uncertainty, localities tend to provide more economic incentives than necessary to hold or 
attract businesses (Betz et al., 2012). 
City-limit theory suggests that local governments are more likely to engage in 
economic-incentive programs if the share of the poor population is high, median-
household income is low, or the quality of public services is low. One argument contends 
that areas with extreme poverty tend to favor economic-development policy because of 
the burden of redistributive programs or the pressure of constituents (Peterson, 1981). 
Rubin and Rubin (1987) examine the practice of Illinois cities of offering cash subsidies, 
revenue bonds, water-rate reductions, or infrastructure to attract and retain business 
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activity. This study reports that cities with low income residents and high unemployment 
are more likely than affluent cities to offer infrastructure improvements, tax abatements, 
and tax-increment financing (TIF). A study by Felix and Hines (2013) provides 
supporting evidence that the probability of offering economic-incentive programs falls by 
3.2 percent when median household income rises by 10 percent. This study also shows 
that if communities contain a larger share of households with median incomes below 
$25,000, they are more likely to offer incentives.  
However, growing evidence in the literature indicates that disadvantaged 
communities are less likely to adopt economic-incentive programs, suggesting that 
economically challenged local governments may find it difficult to invest resources in 
economic-development strategies.  Dewees et al. (2003) studied the extent to which 
county governments have undertaken local economic-development initiatives to improve 
community well-being. The main conclusions show that rural counties are less likely than 
urban counties to engage in economic-development activities, a difference that is 
attributable to socioeconomic characteristics such as poverty and education. However, a 
multivariate analysis suggests that the use of financial incentives is better predicted by 
education and poverty levels than by geography. Once these variables are controlled, the 
rural effect diminishes or disappears. The findings indicate that high poverty and less 
education are associated with less use of economic-development tools, suggesting that 
more-affluent localities use economic-development incentives to a greater degree than 
less-affluent localities, enabling the rich to get richer (Reese, 2006).      
Another factor that can influence choices concerning economic-incentive policy is 
city size. A large city is more likely to offer financial-incentive-based programs than a 
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small city because of a broad range of resources and pressures that are limited in small 
cities (Sullivan, 2002; Fleischmann et al., 1991). Felix and Hines (2013) estimate that 10 
percent population growth increases the likelihood of offering tax incentives by 0.8 
percent. Lobao and Kraybill (2005) found that metro governments are more likely than 
nonmetro governments to implement economic-development programs, noting the 
superior position of metro governments in population attributes, local economic 
conditions, and government capacity and resources. Also, they found that metro areas and 
adjacent counties use financial incentives to retain or expand business activities, while 
remote counties use them to attract new businesses and develop small-business activities. 
Furthermore, recent literature findings go against the city-limit theory, suggesting that the 
likelihood of offering tax incentives is higher for large localities than for small ones. 
Although previous studies have used similar factors or determinants, the results have 
been mixed.  
4.2.1.1 Government Capacity 
Gargan defines government capacity as “ the ability of a local government to do 
what it wants to do” (Gargan, 1981, p. 656). Many previous studies have defined it 
similarly (Swann, 2017; Wang et al., 2018). Generally, existing research shows that a 
local administration’s capacity also affects economic-development policy. Local 
governments with bigger staffs and more expertise or experience tend to adopt such a 
policy, particularly when the government has a specialized department in charge of local 
economic development (Sullivan, 2002; Fleischmann et al., 1991; Lobao & Kraybill, 
2009). These specialized units may be another aspect of the race to the bottom because of 
the pressure that bureaucrats feel to do something.  As discussed in a study by 
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Fleischmann et al. (1992), a positive association exists between government capacity and 
number of economic-incentive programs. However, resistance to this argument has 
surfaced. For instance, York, Feiock, and Steinacker (2013) suggest that bureaucratic 
capacity is not a predictive factor, one reason being that local governments with 
specialized administrative units may be more analytical in designing economic-
development policy, enabling careful reviews of evidence of the efficacy of programs, 
thereby leading to less-frequent adoption.  
Political Factors  
Logan and Molotch (1987) criticized Peterson’s city-limit theory and developed a 
growth-machine theory that emphasizes political factors, rather than economic ones, as 
principal determinants of decisions of localities on economic-development policy (Logan 
& Molotch, 1987). They explain the mechanism of local economic development through 
the actions of business and political interests. Those who actively participate in local 
issues have the most to gain or lose. Policy actors such as politicians, local media, 
retailers, utility companies – all of whom benefit from community growth – act together 
to increase property values (Molotch, 1976). However, those who do not benefit from 
such growth might not have enough political power to exert influence, so their interests 
tend to be ignored in the decision-making process. Furthermore, local political ideology 
impacts economic-development policy choices. Specifically, local governments led by 
Republicans are more likely to offer more incentives (Betz et al., 2012).     
Regarding political factors, Felix and Hines (2013) suggest an interesting 
argument that localities with troubled political cultures are more likely to adopt economic 
incentives. They investigated the relationship between corruption and the number of 
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selected programs, and found that the likelihood of favoring economic-incentive 
programs rather than other types of economic-development policy (e.g., investment in 
infrastructure) increases by 5.9 percent when government officials are convicted of 
federal corruption crimes at a rate higher by 1 per 100,000 residents over the past 13 
years. This suggests that some government officials may adopt economic-incentive 
programs in return for money, political support, or other forms of payouts. In turn, it may 
cause a dysfunctional tax system, making it more difficult for the locality to compete for 
businesses without economic-incentive programs. Localities in states with high rates of 
public-corruption convictions are more likely than others to offer incentives.     
4.2.1.2 Industry Factors      
Many local governments compete with other nearby governments to hold their 
own position or to attract new businesses. Adoption of tax-based incentives is one form 
of such competition. However, not all communities have the same strong desire to 
implement economic-development policies because each community has different 
industrial structures and demographics (Felix & Hines, 2013). This difference leads to a 
diverse trade-off among economic development policies. Differences in willingness to 
offer incentives may reflect the composition of industries and firms that are potential 
beneficiaries (Byrnes, Marvel, & Sridhar, 1999). Communities with a large 
manufacturing base are more likely to provide business tax incentives. A 10 percent 
greater fraction of the workforce in manufacturing is associated with an 8.4 percent 
greater probability of offering tax incentives (Felix & Hines, 2013). Other studies also 
found a positive association between substantial manufacturing employment and more 
active use of tax-based incentives (Reese, 2006; Wang, 2018).  
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4.2.1.3 Neighbor Effect 
 Generally, we assume that state and local governments do not make independent 
economic development policy decisions. Rather, most governments consider and review 
the choices of other governments when they make fiscal decisions. Previous studies also 
support this propensity of local governments (Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005). This 
situation is called policy interdependence and strategic interaction (Wang, 2018). More 
specifically, previous studies have mainly focused on the adoption of policies due to the 
neighbor effect. McHone (1987) indicated that local governments tend to mimic the fiscal 
decisions of neighboring communities. Man (1999) also found that a jurisdiction is more 
likely to adopt TIF if a neighboring jurisdiction did so. Byrne (2005) reported similar 
results, where a community is more likely to offer more TIF if a neighboring community 
did the same. Based on these studies, we can conclude that local governments may affect 
each other’s fiscal policies.          
4.2.2 Hypotheses 
The literature does not offer a consistent estimate of the efficacy of fiscal policy 
(Bartik, 1991; Goetz et al., 2011) and fails to provide a clear direction on which policies 
best promote growth and economic well-being. As discussed briefly above, tax incentives 
account for a negligible portion of business costs, so they rarely determine business 
decisions. As Peters and Fisher (2004) show, almost 90% of firms that received 
incentives said they would have approved investments or hires even without them. Also, 
it is difficult to keep benefits from spreading to other localities, even in cases in which 
tax incentives make an impact, considering the interconnected nature of the U.S. 
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economy (Davis, 2013). The evidence demonstrates that tax incentives are of little benefit 
to states or localities, and are a drag on economic development.  
Nonetheless, states and local governments have used tax incentives significantly, 
and the best available estimates suggest that states and localities are devoting almost $50 
billion to them annually (Davis, 2013). Why, then, do local governments often use tax-
based incentives?  The literature suggests key determinants.  
First, socioeconomic characteristics, particularly income, can explain variations in 
the use of tax incentives across localities, which may be more likely to offer tax-based 
incentives if they have a large population of low-income residents. It is not difficult to 
understand why poor communities use tax-based incentives in an effort to boost business 
activities. A typical poor community, on average, lacks infrastructure and highly skilled 
labor, making investments in such communities less attractive. From this perspective, a 
tax-based incentive aims to offset a less attractive community environment by lowering 
costs for businesses to invest. Recent literature, on the other hand, provides opposing 
evidence that economically challenged localities are less likely to adopt economic-
incentive programs due to limited resources. Although growing evidence supports a 
positive relationship between local economic conditions and tax-based incentives, the 
literature suggests that consensus among researchers has not been reached. On this basis, 
the first hypothesis follows:  
Hypothesis 1: If a state has a large share of low-income residents (based on poverty rate 
and a percentage of residents on public assistance), the state will be more likely to adopt 
tax-based incentives (socioeconomic factor). 
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Basically, economic-development policies of local governments are based on 
fiscal and economic conditions (Fisher & Peters, 1998). The concept of economic and 
fiscal status is reasonably measured by the unemployment rate (Feiock, & Clingermayer, 
1992; Reese, 1991). Rubin and Rubin (1987) also conceptualize this economic status as 
citizen need. Specifically, a high unemployment rate indicates a high demand for local 
economic-development policies. Thus, the city is more likely to try to help residents 
through tax-based incentives. Higher unemployment rates are positively associated with 
the use of economic-development programs (Betz et al., 2012; Lobao & Kraybill, 2005). 
In line with these previous studies, the following hypothesis is proposed:  
Hypothesis 2: If a state has a high unemployment rate, it will be more likely to adopt tax-
based incentives (socioeconomic factor). 
Evidence indicates that communities suffering from political unrest provide 
general tax relief to avoid at least some potential criticism within the communities 
experiencing economic downturns. In troubled political cultures, offering incentives may 
be easier than tailoring new programs or renewing existing ones through negotiations. 
Also, the number of adopted programs may be related to corruption in some cases (Felix 
& Hines, 2013). This suggests that some government officials may choose economic-
incentive programs in return for money, political support, or other forms of payout. There 
is scant literature that examined whether tax-incentive policy adoption is related to 
political elections or corruption. That suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: If a state has more corruption, the state will be more likely to adopt tax-
based incentives (political factor). 
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Political ideology as it relates to tax-based incentives has been analyzed to a 
lesser extent compared with socioeconomic factors, but political factors are highly likely 
to impact local tax-based incentives. For instance, Republicans are more likely to favor 
helping businesses, but they tend to be reluctant to pick winners (Betz et al., 2012). 
Democrats may be more likely to intervene in the economy to create good jobs, but they 
are reluctant to offer corporate welfare to help businesses without creating better jobs 
(Betz et al., 2012). Previous studies support this argument. Specifically, Lewis (2002) 
suggests that a city with Democratic leaders is less likely to offer retail-development 
incentives, negatively impacting industrial recruitment and entrepreneurial strategies 
(Jenkins et al., 2006).Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 4: If a state has a more liberal political ideology, the state will be less likely 
to adopt tax-based incentives (political factor). 
State governments increasingly have been engaging in economic-development 
policy to boost their economies, while facing high unemployment rates and dwindling 
state tax revenue following recessions (Dewees et al., 2003). While some research 
indicates that local governments with larger staffs and more expertise or experience tend 
to adopt such policies, the literature has not found straightforward evidence of a 
relationship between capacity and economic-incentive policy usage (York et al., 2013). 
To measure government capacity,  previous studies have used expenditure ratio and per 
capita government expenditures (Morgan, Hoyman, & McCall, 2019). Broadly speaking, 
local government revenues, expenditures, and employment levels are used as a proxy for 
government capacity (Jeong & Feiock, 2006; Oh, Lee, & Bush, 2014). It is reasonable to 
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ask how government capacity affects choice of tax-based incentives. On that basis, the 
next hypothesis follows: 
Hypothesis 5: If a state has greater government capacity, such as revenue per capita, the 
state will be more likely to adopt tax-based incentives (government-capacity factor). 
Past literature has focused on examining a particular industry, mainly 
manufacturing, and tends to generalize its determinants to entire economic-development 
programs (Felix & Hines, 2013). Other studies also support this argument (Byrnes et al., 
1999; Reese, 2006; Wang, 2018). Another determinant in explaining economic-
development activity choices entails declines in certain economic sectors (Wolman & 
Spitzley, 1996). The U.S. manufacturing industry has been suffering since the 1980s, 
especially in Midwestern states collectively called the Rust Belt. In this regard, it is 
reasonable to ask how a community’s manufacturing industry impacts the adoption of 
economic incentives. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed. 
Hypothesis 6: If a state has a larger manufacturing base, it will be more likely to adopt 
tax-based incentives (industry factor). 
Finally, the literature has identified the neighbor effect on fiscal policies. For 
instance, Anderson and Wassmer (1995) provided evidence that a community adopts 
property tax abatement in response to other communities’ adoption of property tax 
abatement. Felix and Hines (2013) reached similar conclusions, that if a community is 
closer to state borders, the community is more likely to offer business incentives. The 
main purpose of analyzing the neighbor effect and strategic interaction is to test whether 
economic development policy is partly influenced by competition among neighboring 
communities (Byrne, 2005). Although we confirm the neighbor effect on incentives, we 
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do not know the extent to which neighboring business incentives affect communities, as 
previous literature is limited in this regard.  We propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: If neighboring states offer more tax-based incentives, a state is more likely 
to offer more tax-based incentives via the neighbor effect. 
4.2.3 Research Design 
This study’s objective is to examine why state governments adopt tax-based 
incentives. This section describes data sources, key variables, and a model that will be 
used in the analysis. 
4.2.3.1 Data  
The study period covers 1990 through 2015. The primary data source is the 
Upjohn Institute Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes (PDIT, from the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute, 2019). Economist Tim Bartik played a central role in developing this unique 
database, which includes taxes and incentive data for 45 industries and 32 states. 
Although data-collection limits prevent the PDIT from including every state and industry, 
the 32 states examined account for 92% of U.S. GDP, and the 45 industries examined 
encompass 91% of U.S. compensation (W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2019). There is a practical 
reason for why not all states are included. Specifically, Bartik (2017) explained that 50% 
more researcher’s work is needed to cover all states, but 18 states alone account for a 
minor portion of business activities. The PDIT does not include all incentives, but does 
contain the five most commonly used: investment tax credits, research and development 
(R&D) tax credits, job-creation tax credits, property tax abatements, and customized 
grants (W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2019). State-corruption data are from the Public Integrity 
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Section of the Department of Justice. The state-corruption rate indicates “the number of 
public officials in the state in which a community is located convicted of federal 
corruption-related crimes” (Felix & Hines, 2013, p. 84). To measure state government 
ideology, this paper is based on  Berry et al. (2010).  A government’s ideology is 
evaluated based on average elected officials (Berry et al., 2010). Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA) and the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE) 
conducted the evaluation (Berry et al., 2010). The first version of the data is based on 
COPE and ADA scores that are unadjusted interest-group ratings (Berry et al., 2010). 
After updating, state government ideology data are based on NOMINATE3 common-
space scores. 
To analyze the neighbor effect and measure neighbor business incentives, this 
paper uses a method similar to previous studies. For instance, Besley and Case (1992) 
referenced the average tax change of geographically neighboring states when they 
defined the neighbors’ tax change; this paper comparably defines neighboring average 
total tax incentives. Neighboring average total tax incentives indicate the average 
geographically neighboring state tax-based incentive percentage. The secondary data 
sources for socioeconomic variables are the Decennial Census and American Community 
Survey, while data on state government expenditures are taken from the Annual Survey 
of State and Local Finances. The details are presented in Table 4.1.  
 
 
 
3 This is “ an aggregate measure that accounts for partisan affiliation and power in the governor and state 
legislature” (Leiser, 2017, p 345). 
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Table 4.1 Variable definition and data sources 
 Variable Definition Data Source 
Dependent 
Variables 
Total Incentives (sum  of the 
following five variables)  
The Percentage of Tax incentives 
of State-local Business Taxes  
Panel Database on 
Incentives and Taxes 
(PDIT 1990, 2000, 
2005-2015) 
Job Creation Tax Credit The Percentage of Tax incentives 
of State-local Business Taxes by 
Job Creation tax credit 
Investment Tax Credit The Percentage of Tax incentives 
of State-local Business Taxes by 
Investment Tax credit 
Research and Development  
(R&D) Tax Credit 
The Percentage of Tax incentives 
of State-local Business Taxes by 
R&D tax credit  
Property Tax Abatement The Percentage of Tax incentives 
of State-local Business Taxes by 
Property Tax Abatement 
Customized Job Training 
Subsidy 
The Percentage of Tax incentives 
of State-local Business Taxes by 
Customized Job Training 
Independent 
Variables 
Poverty rates The ratio of the number of people 
whose income falls below the 
poverty line 
US Decennial Census 
(1990, 2000, and 
2010) and ACS 
(2005-2009, 2011-
2015) 
Unemployment rate The Percentage of unemployed 
workers 
Percentage Public Assistance The Percentage of Households 
with cash public assistance or 
Food Stamps 
Neighboring average total tax 
incentive  
The average Percentage of Tax 
incentives of neighboring State-
local Business Taxes 
Panel Database on 
Incentives and Taxes, 
(PDIT 1990, 2000, 
2005-2015) 
State Corruption rate Public Corruption Convictions per 
100,000 population 
Department of Justice  
 
Berry et al., 2010, 
and Fording’s 
website 
Government ideology indicator Conservative (0) to Liberal (100) 
Revenue per capita Revenue divided by population Government Finance 
Database (Pierson, 
Hand, & Thompson, 
2015a) 
Percentage Infrastructure 
Expenditure 
The percentage of transportation 
and highways expenditure in total 
revenue 
Percentage Welfare Expenditure The percentage of social service 
and public welfare expenditure in 
total revenue 
Percentage of Manufacturing 
Employment 
Manufacturing as a share of 
employment 
US Decennial Census 
(1990, 2000, and 
2010) and ACS 
(2005-2009, 2011-
2015) 
  
  
  
Control 
Variables 
Percentage BA Degree or 
higher  
Percentage of population with 
bachelor’s degree or higher 
US Decennial Census 
(1990, 2000, and 
2010) and ACS 
(2005-2009, 2011-
2015) 
 Percentage Over 65 Percentage of population 65 years 
and over 
Median Income (log) Median log of income in dollars 
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4.2.3.2 Variables  
Dependent Variable  
This paper examines five widely used tax-based incentives: job-creation tax 
credits, investment tax credits, R&D tax credits, property tax abatements, and customized 
job-training grants. The unit-of-incentive measure is the percentage4 of tax incentives 
compared with state and local business taxes. To clarify, “The measure shows present 
value of incentives divided by present value of gross taxes” (Bartik, 2017, p. 47). In other 
words, it measures to what extent a state uses incentives: A high value denotes heavy use 
of incentives. As Figure 4.1 shows, the primary dependent variable includes total 
incentives and each type of business incentive from 1990 to 2015. The total value of 
incentives is the sum of the value of job-creation tax credits, investment tax credits, R&D 
tax credits, property tax abatements, and customized job-training subsidies. Figure 4.1 
shows the trend of business incentives included in this study. Generally, state government 
average total use of tax incentives has increased steadily since 1990, but the when and 
where of the incentives vary. The use of job-creation tax credits has grown between 2005 
and 2015, but the use of other incentives has remained static. States have invested less in 
R&D tax credits and customized job-training subsidies but have spent comparatively 
more in investment tax credits and property tax abatements.  
 
4 “Present value calculated using 12 percent discount rate for new facility begun in 2015 and operated at 
same scale for 20 years” (Bartik, 2017, p. 47). 
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Figure 4.1 The trend in total incentives between 1990 and 2015. 
 
0.00%
5.00%
10.00%
15.00%
20.00%
25.00%
30.00%
35.00%
1990 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
The trend of total incentives between 1990 and 2015
108 
 
 
Figure 4.2 The trend in business incentives between 1990 and 2015 
 
 
Independent Variables  
Many studies use socioeconomic factors to analyze determinants of tax-based 
incentives (Sullivan, 2002; Dewees et al., 2003; Felix & Hines, 2013; Fleischmann et al., 
1992;. Reese, 2006; Rubin & Rubin, 1987). Based on previous studies, the primary 
independent variables include poverty rate, percentage of public assistance, and 
unemployment rate as socioeconomic factors, and as political factors, state-corruption 
rate and government-ideology indicators. Percentage of infrastructure expenditures, 
percentage of welfare expenditures, and revenue per capita measure state government 
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capacity. The share of employment in manufacturing is a state industry factor. Lastly, 
neighboring average total tax incentive is included as a neighbor effect.  
Control Variables  
The relationship between tax-based incentives and the primary independent 
variable is tested while controlling for demographic characteristics and environmental 
context. The demographic characteristics include percentage of bachelor’s degrees or 
higher and percentage 65 years old and up. The percentage over 65 years old is controlled 
because older people are more likely to be active political participants (Rork, 2003). The 
environmental context includes a set of variables indicating a state’s income level: 
median income and manufacturing income. The details on all variables are presented in 
Table 4.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
110 
 
Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Sample 
size 
Mean SD Min Max 
Total Incentives 416 26.80 20.88 0.00 99.44 
Job Creation Tax Credit 416 9.59 11.49 0.00 57.44 
Investment Tax Credit 416  6.42 12.84 0.00 72.04 
R&D Tax Credit 416  2.08  2.46 0.00 12.35 
Property Tax Abatement 416  7.16  9.63 0.00 43.69 
Customized Job Training Subsidy 416  1.55  1.81 0.00 6.89 
Poverty rate 416 13.54  3.57 5.00 21.90 
Government Ideology Indicator 416 46.95 16.34 17.51 73.62 
% Over65 416 12.99  1.56 9.20 18.60 
% BA or Higher 416 26.97  5.31 13.63 40.50 
Unemployment Rate 416  7.14  2.18 2.46 12.70 
% Infrastructure Expenditure 416  6.29  2.12  1.80 17.77 
% Public Assistance 416 10.05  3.91 1.71 24.15 
% Welfare Expenditure 416 22.93  4.18 7.48 38.78 
Median income (log) 416 10.83  0.25 10.00 11.45 
State Corruption rate (Federal Public Corruption 
Convictions per 100,000) 
416  0.32  0.23 0.00 1.24 
% of Manufacturing Employment 416 12.01 4.52 3.60 26.69 
Revenue per capita (log) 416  5.74 1.79 1.52 10.65 
Total incentives in neighboring states  416 27.98 14.39 0.46 61.99 
Note: Data includes 32 states over 13 years 
 
4.2.3.3 Model  
This study uses fixed-effects panel estimates for 32 U.S. states between 1990 and 
2015 to examine what makes tax-based incentives attractive to policy makers. The 
purpose of this method is to control time-invariant characteristics of states that could 
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have impacts on the use of tax incentives. Allison (2009) explains ‘the fixed effects 
methods effectively controls for all time invariant predictors, both measured and 
unmeasured’ (p.26).  One way to explore determinants of tax-based incentives in U.S. 
states is to include all control variables in a year the same as the dependent variable. 
However, a potential problem is that the incentives and other control variables, 
specifically government-expenditure variables, are likely to be endogenous because state 
government officials may decide on the types and amount of government expenditures to 
use in year t based on the amount of tax incentives in year t-1. Therefore, this study uses 
lagged values for independent variables to address the potential endogeneity issue. The 
methodology used in this study is consistent with previous studies (Gittell & Tebaldi, 
2007; Gittell et al., 2014). Also, this study includes year fixed effects to control for 
macroeconomic and political factors that could impact the trend of tax incentives at the 
national level.  The following model is estimated:  
Tax incentives it = β1 Socioecoit-1 + β2 Gov’t Capacityit-1 + β3 Politicit-1 + β4 Industryit-1 + 
β5 Neighboringit- + β6 Xit-1 + αi + dt+ εit  
in which i indexes state, t indexes time, tax incentives indicate the percentage of tax 
incentives relative to total state and local business taxes within a state i in year t. It 
measures to what extent a state uses incentives. The parameter 𝛽1 measures the effect of 
socioeconomic variables on tax-based incentives, and β2, β3, β4 and β5 measure the 
primary independent variable effects on incentives. Other covariates that capture a state’s 
socioeconomic conditions and likely affect tax incentives are included in vector Xi,t-1. 
Finally, 𝛼i denotes a set of state-fixed effects, dt indicates a set of year-fixed effects, and 
𝜀 is the error term.  
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4.2.4 Results 
4.2.4.1 Primary Determinants 
Table 4.3 shows the results from panel fixed-effects estimates on primary 
determinants and a series of control variables. The coefficients in five subcategories add 
up to the total effect estimated overall because the dependent variables are defined as 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive subcategories. Column 1 in Table 4.3 indicates that 
socioeconomic factors such as percentage of public assistance and poverty rate have no 
statistically significant effect on the total use of tax-based incentives. This result does not 
support findings in previous studies that socioeconomic factors have a statistically 
significant effect on the total use of tax-based incentives (Betz et al., 2012; Lobao & 
Kraybill, 2005). However, the results differ by category. Specifically, the findings show 
that a 1% increase in the poverty rate increases the average percentage of investment tax 
incentives in gross taxes by 0.77%, holding all other variables constant. The 
unemployment rate statistically reduces the percentage of customized job-training 
subsidies from gross taxes. This result supports the contention that economically poor 
local governments may find it difficult to invest resources in economic-development 
strategies (Dewees et al., 2003; Reese, 2006). 
Rows 1 and 2 of Table 4.3 show the effect of political factors on the use of tax-
based incentives. This study did not find statistically significant evidence that a rise in the 
state corruption rate would increase the use of tax-based incentives. On the other hand, 
the government-ideology score impacted the use of tax-based incentives. The findings 
show a 1-point increase in state government ideology score (high score = more liberal, 
range = 100 points) increases the percentage of job creation tax credits from gross taxes 
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by 0.09%. Liberalism in a given state increases the use of job-creation tax credits, but 
reduces investment tax credits, property-tax abatement, and customized job-training 
subsidies. A state government’s ideology has a statistically significant impact on the type 
of tax-based incentives. We can suggest that government ideology could serve as a 
powerful mechanism in the allocation of tax-based incentives.   
Three variables measure state government capacity. The findings vary depending 
on the type of tax-based incentives involved. First, revenue per capita increases the use of 
R&D tax credits and statistically decreases the use of property tax abatement. Second, the 
percentage of infrastructure expenditures has no statistical impact on the type of tax-
based incentive. 
Finally, the percentage of welfare expenditures is positively associated with total 
incentives and investment tax credits. Although these results partially support previous 
studies that indicate the level of government capacity is closely related to the use of tax-
based incentives, they also indicate that capacity has different effects based on the type of 
expenditure and incentives (York et al., 2013).  
Table 3 shows that the percentage of manufacturing employment does not support 
the findings of previous studies. As the percentage of manufacturing employment 
increases, total incentives, job creation tax credit, and property tax abatements decrease. 
Considering the U.S. manufacturing industry’s condition, this finding is especially 
surprising. Perhaps communities have observed that manufacturing industry often leaves 
in later years and doubt the long-term value of the investment. 
Neighboring states’ average tax incentives have an unexpected impact on the use 
of business incentives. That is, as the percentage of their average tax incentives increases, 
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total incentives and job creation tax credit decrease. This result is contrary to previous 
studies and may suggest that competition strategies among the states may not trigger tax-
based incentives. This result suggests the possibility that the empirical data indicating 
that tax-based incentives are not effective may be utilized as a control mechanism in local 
governments. In other words, learning mechanisms demonstrating the ineffectiveness of 
incentives may arrest the spread of adoption. Additionally, a negative relationship 
between the use of the neighboring states’ total incentives and the extent of these 
incentives may suggest that these tax-based incentives are substitutes rather than 
complements to each state.   
4.2.4.2 Control Variables 
Demographic factors partially impact the use of incentives. Specifically, the 
percentage of residents with bachelor’s degrees or higher reduces the use of R&D tax 
credits and customized job-training subsidies, and median income reduces the use of 
customized job training subsidies. However, the percentage of residents over age 65 has 
no statistically significant effect on tax incentives. 
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Table 4.3 Panel regression results: The effect of determinants on the tax-based incentives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Total 
Incentives 
Job 
Creation 
Tax 
Credit 
Investment 
Tax Credit 
R&D 
Tax 
Credit 
Property  
Tax 
Abateme
nt 
Customized  
Job Training 
Subsidy 
Government Ideology 
Indicator (high: liberal) t-1 
-0.03 0.09*** -0.03* 0.00 -0.09*** -0.01*** 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
State Corruption rate  -2.17 -2.93 0.97 -0.22 -0.12 0.13 
(Public Corruption 
Conviction per 100,000) t-1 
(2.65) (1.87) (0.99) (0.31) (1.66) (0.18) 
Revenue per capita(log) t-1 0.04 0.76 -0.11 0.15* -0.83** 0.07 
 (0.70) (0.50) (0.26) (0.08) (0.44) (0.05) 
% Infrastructure 
Expenditure t-1 
-0.00 0.15 0.13 0.06 -0.33 -0.01 
(0.38) (0.27) (0.14) (0.04) (0.24) (0.03) 
.% Welfare Expenditure t-1 0.54** -0.00 0.28*** -0.01 0.25 0.01 
 (0.26) (0.18) (0.10) (0.03) (0.16) (0.02) 
% BA or Higher t-1 0.36 0.29 0.49 -0.19* -0.10 -0.12* 
 (0.91) (0.64) (0.34) (0.11) (0.57) (0.06) 
% Over 65% t-1 -0.09 -0.58 0.66 -0.17 -0.06 0.06 
 (1.67) (1.18) (0.62) (0.19) (1.05) (0.12) 
Neighbor effect  t-1 -0.18** -0.10* -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.00 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.03) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Median income (log) t-1 4.61 21.20 -9.62 -1.51 -1.33 -4.13*** 
 (22.00) (15.50) (8.21) (2.55) (13.83) (1.53) 
Unemployment Rate t-1 -2.33*** -1.18* -0.76** -0.10 -0.18 -0.11* 
 (0.89) (0.62) (0.33) (0.10) (0.56) (0.06) 
Poverty Rate t-1 1.29 0.73 0.77** -0.11 -0.01 -0.08 
 (0.81) (0.57) (0.30) (0.09) (0.51) (0.06) 
% Public Assistance t-1 0.35 0.31 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.02 
 (0.37) (0.26) (0.14) (0.04) (0.24) (0.03) 
% of Manufacturing 
Employment t-1 
-1.40*** -0.62* 0.27 -0.08 -0.99*** 0.01 
(0.50) (0.35) (0.19) (0.06) (0.31) (0.03) 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -18.34 -211.42 73.68 23.66 25.57 46.73*** 
 (235.18) (165.65) (87.80) (27.11) (147.81) (16.37) 
Observations 384 384 384 384 384 384 
R-squared 0.19 0.22 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.16 
Number of states 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.  The coefficients in 
the total incentives regression are the sums of the coefficients in the five subcategories, as 
they are defined as mutually exclusive and exhaustive subcategories 
4.3 Conclusion  
While many studies argue that tax incentives have a negligible impact on local 
economies, tax incentives have long played a role in economic-development policy in the 
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U.S. and continue to be a popular policy tool used by state and local governments. Recent 
competition to attract Amazon’s second headquarters reveals how governments are 
willing to offer billions of dollars in tax breaks and other subsidies to attract such 
corporations. The designation of opportunity zones in low-income neighborhoods is in 
line with tax-based incentive policy because they offer preferential tax treatment to 
investors.  
A state government’s prevailing political ideology influences the choice of 
economic-development activities, indicating that political conditions play an important 
role in state economic policy. Thus, a more liberal state may be more likely to discourage 
the use of investment tax credits, property tax abatement, and customized job-training 
subsidies. The empirical results in my study show that local politics could be an 
important factor that increases or decreases the use of economic development policies. 
According to previous results, the form of government, changes in political leadership, 
and the government ideology indicator influence the use of economic development 
policies. It is worth noting that local government factors have acted as a major selective 
force in economic development policies. Specifically, any local politics does not 
consistently have a significant impact on the use of policies, but the results show which 
factors have a significant relationship in the local area. Elective influence of local 
government is the main contribution of this dissertation. This study also finds that state 
economic conditions are inversely related to the use of incentives. For example, as 
unemployment rates increase, state governments are likely to decrease their total 
incentives, job creation tax credits, investment tax credits, and customized job-training 
subsidies. This result could imply the prevalence of political factors in the use of 
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incentives. Finally, the extent of tax-based incentives in neighboring states reduces the 
total use of tax incentives. These results suggest that tax-based incentives may be a 
substitute among states, or perhaps the ineffectiveness of the incentives is observed by 
neighboring states. 
Only a few national studies have been conducted on this question. Using new data 
on nationwide tax incentives at the state level, this study examined determinants of tax 
incentives across the U.S. over time. Both political and economic factors are associated 
with business-incentive policies.   
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CHAPTER 5. THE EFFECTS OF STATE TAX-BASED INCENTIVES ON U.S. LABOR MARKETS, 
1990–2015: BOON OR BOONDOGGLE? 
 
 
Abstract 
Clear evidence about the effectiveness of economic development incentives is limited. To 
bridge this research gap, this study uses the Upjohn Institute Panel Database on 
Incentives and Taxes (PDIT). Unemployment and employment rates are used to analyze 
the effectiveness of tax-based incentives. Statistical results indicate that tax incentives 
have a marginal impact on employment status and limited benefits to states. Only the 
R&D tax credit statistically significantly increases employment rates. This result supports 
the interpretation of economic development policies as a zero-sum game.  
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5.1 Introduction 
Many states and local governments in the United States offer economic 
development incentives to boost their local area. The effectiveness of these incentives is 
an emerging issue (Bartik & Erickcek, 2014). The analysis is based on two underlying 
reasons. First, each state needs to increase the number of jobs available to overcome the 
Great Recession (Bartik, 2001). Second, billions of dollars have been spent on incentives 
across the nation (Peters & Fisher, 2004). Despite the importance of this issue, we do not 
have clear information about the effectiveness of economic development incentives 
because the literature shows opposing results. 
Previous studies argue that tax incentives positively impact local investment, 
economic growth, and employment (Hollenbeck, 2008; Holzer et al., 1993; Hoyt, Jepsen, 
& Troske, 2008). On the contrary, other studies report that business incentives do not 
significantly impact local areas (Boarnet & Bogart, 1996; Carlton, 1983). Therefore, 
previous studies only partially addressed the question whether economic development 
incentives are effective. 
Accordingly, this paper aims to contribute to the field of business incentives by 
posing the following research questions: (1) How important are tax incentives to overall 
unemployment rate and employment rate by state? (2) What is the impact of incentives 
on the unemployment rate and employment rate of states? The first section outlines the 
research design. The next section analyzes the results, and the final section offers 
conclusions.  
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5.2 Research Design 
The aim of this study is to examine the effects of state tax-based incentives on 
economic performance measured as the unemployment rate and employment rate of U.S. 
states over time. Additionally, this article empirically tests the proposition that economic 
development policies have the nature of a zero-sum game. This section discusses data, 
key variables, and a model that will be used for analysis. 
5.2.1 Data  
The study period is from 1990 to 2015. The primary data source is the Upjohn 
Institute Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes (PDIT). The PDIT includes the five 
most commonly used tax-based incentives: investment tax credits, research and 
development (R&D) tax credits, job creation tax credits, property tax abatements, and 
customized grants (W.E. Upjohn Institute, 2019).  The secondary data sources for 
socioeconomic variables are the Decennial Census and American Community Survey, 
while data on state government expenditures are taken from the Government Finance 
Database. The details are presented in Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1 Variable definitions and data sources 
 Variable Definition Data Source 
Dependent 
variable 
Unemployment Rate 
Employment Rate 
The percentage of 
unemployment within a state 
The percentage of 
employment within a state 
US Decennial 
Census (1990, 
2000 & 2010) and 
ACS (2005-2009, 
2011-2015) 
Independent 
Variables 
Total Incentives (sum of 
the following five 
variables)  
The percentage of Tax 
incentives of State-local 
Business taxes 
Panel Database on 
Incentives and 
Taxes, PDIT 
(1990, 2000, & 
2005-2015) Job Creation Tax Credit The Percentage of Tax 
incentives of State-local 
Business Taxes by Job 
Creation tax credit 
Investment Tax Credit The Percentage of Tax 
incentives of State-local 
Business Taxes by 
Investment Tax credit 
Research and Development 
(R&D) Credit 
The Percentage of Tax 
incentives of State-local 
Business Taxes by R&D tax 
credit 
Property Tax Abatement The Percentage of Tax 
incentives of State-local 
Business Taxes by Property 
Tax Abatement 
Customized Job Training 
Subsidy 
The Percentage of Tax 
incentives of State-local 
Business Taxes by 
Customized Job Training 
Subsidy 
Control 
Variables 
% Public Assistance The percentage of 
households with cash public 
assistance or Food Stamps 
US Decennial 
Census (1990, 
2000 & 2010) and 
ACS (1990, 2005-
2009, 2011-2015) 
% of owner occupied 
housing 
The percentage of 
households in owner 
occupied housing 
Housing value (log) Median housing value in 
dollars 
Population (log) Total population  
% Under 5 Under 5 year (%) 
% Over 65 65 years and over (%) 
Median Income (log) Median income in dollars 
% BA Degree or higher  Percent bachelor’s degree or 
higher 
% Edu Expenditure The percentage of education 
expenditure in total revenue 
Annual Survey of 
State, Local 
Finance (2000-
2015) 
Government 
Finance Database 
(Pierson et al., 
2015b) 
% Infrastructure 
Expenditure 
The percentage of 
transportation and highways 
expenditure in total revenue 
% Welfare Expenditure The percentage of social 
service and public welfare 
expenditure in total revenue 
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5.2.2 Variables  
Dependent Variable  
Many studies use employment indicators to evaluate the effect of incentives 
(Ham, Swenson, Imrohorǧlu, & Song, 2011; Hanson & Rohlin, 2013; Reynolds & 
Rohlin, 2015). Wasylenko and McGuire (1985) use percentage change in employment as 
a dependent variable to determine the effect of the business climate on the state economy. 
Bartolome and Spiegel (1997) rely on the level of employment to evaluate the effects of 
economic development agency spending. Gabe and Kraybill (2002) use unemployment 
rates to analyze the effect of state business incentives. Accordingly, this study also uses 
employment indicators as outcome variables. To measure the effect of state business 
incentives on the state economy, the unemployment and employment rate are used as the 
dependent variables because those indicators represent the effect of the incentives overall. 
As shown in Table 5.2, states in this sample average a 7.14% unemployment rate. The 
range of unemployment rate is between 2.46% and 12.70%.  
Independent Variables  
This study also examines five tax-based incentives: R&D tax credits, job-creation 
tax credits, property tax abatements, investment tax credits, and customized job-training 
grants. The unit of incentive measure is the percentage of tax incentives of state-local 
business taxes. It measures the extent to which a state government uses incentives, with a 
high value indicating a high use of incentives. One of the key strengths of this database is 
that it is exceptionally comprehensive because it covers the majority of business activities 
from 1990 to 2015, which is a relatively long period. 
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Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Employment rate 416 59.94 3.60 52.50 68.20 
Unemployment Rate 416 7.14 2.19 2.46 12.70 
Total Incentives 416 26.80 20.88 0.00 99.44 
Job Creation Tax Credit 416 9.59 11.49 0.00 57.44 
Investment Tax Credit 416 6.42 12.84 0.00 72.04 
Research and Development Credit 416 2.08 2.46 0.00 12.35 
Property Tax Abatement 416 7.16 9.63 0.00 43.69 
Customized Job Training Subsidy 416 1.55 1.81 0.00 6.89 
Poverty rate 416 13.54 3.57 5.00 21.90 
% Owner Occupied Housing 416 67.25 4.46 52.20 76.30 
Housing Value (log) 416 12.02 0.45 10.73 13.19 
Population  416 15.69 0.68 13.99 17.46 
% Under Age 5 416 6.66 0.57 5.30 8.40 
% Over Age 65 416 12.99 1.56 9.20 18.60 
Median Income (log) 416 10.83 0.25 9.99 11.45 
% BA Degree or higher  416 26.97 5.30 13.63 40.50 
% Edu Expenditure 416 28.72 7.66 6.73 44.22 
% Infrastructure Expenditure 416 6.29 2.12 1.80 17.77 
% Welfare Expenditure 416 22.93 4.18 7.48 38.78 
 
Control Variables  
Many studies that examine the employment effects of tax incentives include several 
control variables that measure socioeconomic characteristics and government 
expenditures, including public education, infrastructure, and welfare. Wasylenko and 
McGuire (1985) separate their control variables into three categories: labor, fiscal, and 
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market. The labor category includes prime working age population (age 25 to 55); the 
fiscal category includes a set of variables that indicate state and local governments’ 
expenditure on education and welfare; and the market category includes state population 
density and per capita state income. Freedman (2012) similarly categorizes control 
variables: demographic characteristics, housing characteristics, and change in 
neighborhood characteristics. The demographic characteristics include the population, the 
number of persons under age 5, the number over age 65, median income, and poverty 
rate. Housing characteristics include the share of owner-occupied housing, and median 
household income and median housing value are included to measure neighborhood 
characteristics.  
As many other previous studies also follow this pattern (Goss & Phillips, 1999; 
Ham et al., 2011; Hanson, 2009; Hanson & Rohlin, 2013; Reynolds & Rohlin, 2015), this 
study includes a set of variables that measure each state’s socioeconomic characteristics 
and government expenditures on public services. Over the study period, the average 
poverty rate is 13.54% across 32 states. Population, age structure, education, and median 
household income, are also used as socioeconomic characteristics. This study also 
includes variables related to housing, such as the percentage of owner-occupied housing 
and median housing values, because the quality of the neighborhood is capitalized in 
housing if the housing market works efficiently. As Table 5.2 shows, the average 
percentage of owner-occupied housing was 67.25% over the study period. Finally, three 
variables that measure state government spending on public education, infrastructure, and 
welfare are included because the level of government expenditure is closely related to the 
local economy (Wasylenko & McGuire, 1985). The details are presented in Table 5.2. 
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5.2.3 Model  
This study uses fixed-effects panel estimates for 32 U.S. states in each year 
between 1990 and 2015 to examine the effects of incentives on unemployment rate and 
employment rate. The first model presented below applies to unemployment rates, and 
the second model applies to employment rates. Each model estimates the effects of total 
tax incentives and sub-five categories of tax incentives, respectively. One way to evaluate 
the effects of tax incentives on unemployment rate and employment rate is to include all 
control variables in a year as the same as the dependent variable.  However, a potential 
endogeneity problem may exist, because state government officials may decide the types 
and amount of tax incentives to use in year t based on employment status in year t-1. 
Therefore, this paper uses lagged values for independent variables to address the potential 
endogeneity issue. The following models are estimated:  
 
Unemployment ratei,t  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Tax Incentivei,t-1 + 𝛽2 Socioecoi,t-1 +  𝛽3 Gov’tCapacityi,t-1 
+ 𝛽4 Industryi,t-1 𝛽5 Xi,t-1 + 𝛼i + dt+ 𝜀i,t 
Employment ratei,t  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Tax Incentivei,t-1 + 𝛽2 Socioecoi,t-1 +  𝛽3 Gov’tCapacityi,t-1 + 
𝛽4 Industryi,t-1 𝛽5 Xi,t-1 + 𝛼i + dt + 𝜀i,t 
where i indexes states, t indexes time, and Incentive measures the percentage of tax 
incentives of state-local business taxes. The parameter 𝛽1 measures the effect of tax 
incentives on unemployment rate and employment rate. All other covariates that capture 
a state’s socioeconomic conditions that likely affect employment are in vector Xi,t-1. 
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Finally, 𝛼i denotes a set of state fixed effects, dt indicates a set of year fixed effects and 𝜀 
is the error term.  
5.3 Results 
Tax-based Incentives 
Table 5.3 shows the results of a regression analysis on the effects of business 
incentives on the unemployment rate in 32 states from 1990 to 2015. Column 1 in Table 
5.3 is the results of the OLS analysis, and Column 2 reveals the results of panel fixed-
effects estimates on the use of tax incentives and a series of control variables. The panel 
fixed-effect model is preferable to the OLS model.  
Although OLS shows a 1% increase in total tax incentives is likely to reduce the 
average unemployment rate by 0.01%, holding all other variables constant, when state 
and year fixed effects are included, the negative effects of tax incentives on 
unemployment rate disappear. In other words, the sign of the coefficient on total 
incentives was positive and statistically insignificant. There is significant variation 
between states and over time.   
Table 5.4 shows the results of five regression analyses on state unemployment 
rate using five tax-based incentives as key independent variables. Column 1, the 
employment effects of job-creation tax credits, does not support findings in previous 
studies that the incentive has a statistically significant effect on the unemployment rate 
(Bartik & Erickcek, 2014). Considering that the average use of job-creation tax credits in 
U.S. states has more than doubled between 2000 and 2015, this finding is especially 
surprising.  
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Column 2 of Table 5.4 shows the employment effects of investment tax credits 
and a positive coefficient on tax credits. Moreover, this study did not find statistically 
significant evidence that an increase in investment tax credits would reduce 
unemployment rates, as standard economic theory suggests. Conversely, the results show 
that investment tax credits statistically increase unemployment. These results suggest that 
investment tax credit does not influence employment because it is usually related to a 
specific asset, such as equipment. Similarly, column 3 reports the effects of R&D tax 
credits and shows no significant decrease in unemployment rate. As shown in Columns 4 
and 5, this study also did not find a significant effect of providing grants for property tax 
abatements and customized job training subsidy. These findings suggest that untargeted 
incentives based on whether an industry provides jobs, wages, or R&D do not 
significantly affect employment.  Targeted incentives, such as customized job training, 
failed to achieve the intended policy outcome. Note that state governments have invested 
heavily in this field.  
Across all models, this study finds consistent evidence on the effects of 
socioeconomic characteristics on the unemployment rate in U.S. states. Briefly, the 
results indicate the poverty rate and population size have a positive effect on the 
unemployment rate. On the other hand, the percentage of owner occupied housing has a 
negative effect on the unemployment rate.  
This study included three variables that measure state government expenditures 
on education, infrastructure, and welfare, as many previous studies argue that the level of 
government expenditure is closely related to employment status in the local labor market. 
While the findings vary depending on the types of expenditure examined, most found that 
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higher spending on education tends to have a positive impact on employment factors such 
as job growth (Wasylenko & McGuire, 1985). However, across all models, this study 
demonstrates that state expenditure on education does not statistically significantly 
impact the unemployment rate. Results of this study also indicate a higher share of state 
spending on infrastructure positively and statistically significantly affects the 
unemployment rate. Additionally, the findings show an increase in welfare spending 
increases the unemployment rate. 
Table 5.3 OLS and panel regression results: The effects of total incentives on unemployment 
rates 
 
Unemployment rates 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
Total Incentives t-1 -0.01** 0.01  
(0.00) (0.00) 
Poverty rate t-1 0.37*** 0.37***  
(0.02) (0.05) 
% of Owner Occupied Housing t-1 -0.01 -0.11**  
(0.02) (0.05) 
Housing Value (log) t-1 0.53* -0.34  
(0.32) (0.40) 
Population (log) t-1 0.30*** 2.27***  
(0.10) (0.70) 
% Under 5 t-1 -1.66*** -1.01***  
(0.19) (0.19) 
% Over 65 t-1 -0.12* 0.16  
(0.07) (0.12) 
Median Income (log) t-1 1.44*** -0.72  
(0.46) (1.64) 
% BA or higher t-1 -0.06** 0.09  
(0.02) (0.06) 
% Edu Expenditure t-1 0.03** 0.01  
(0.01) (0.02) 
% Infrastructure Expenditure t-1 -0.15*** 0.06**  
(0.04) (0.03) 
% Welfare Expenditure t-1 -0.03* 0.03  
(0.02) (0.02) 
State Fixed Effects No Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes 
Constant -8.59* -14.34  
(4.71) (17.47) 
Observations 384 384 
R-squared 0.68 0.93 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.4 Panel regression results: The effects of each tax incentives on unemployment 
rate 
 
Unemployment Rate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Job Creation Tax Credit t-1 0.01 
    
 
(0.01) 
    
Investment Tax Credit t-1 
 
0.01** 
   
  
(0.01) 
   
Research and Development Credit t-1 
  
-0.04 
  
   
(0.03) 
  
Property Tax Abatement t-1 
   
-0.00 
 
    
(0.01) 
 
Customized Job Training Subsidy t-1 
    
-0.05      
(0.05) 
Poverty rate t-1 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.36***  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
% of Owner Occupied Housing t-1 -0.13** -0.10* -0.11** -0.13** -0.12** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Housing Value (log) t-1 -0.29 -0.30 -0.34 -0.28 -0.31 
 
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.40) 
Population (log) t-1 2.15*** 2.23*** 2.01*** 2.01*** 1.97***  
(0.69) (0.69) (0.68) (0.69) (0.69) 
% Under 5 t-1 -0.70 -0.99 -0.88 -0.75 -0.95  
(1.65) (1.64) (1.65) (1.65) (1.66) 
% Over 65 t-1 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.16 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Median Income (log) t-1 -0.70 -0.99 -0.88 -0.75 -0.95 
 
(1.65) (1.64) (1.65) (1.65) (1.66) 
% BA or higher t-1 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07  
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
% Edu Expenditure t-1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
% Infrastructure Expenditure t-1 0.06** 0.05** 0.06** 0.06** 0.06**  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
% Welfare Expenditure t-1 0.03* 0.03 0.03* 0.03* 0.03* 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -12.77 -12.10 -9.43 -10.47 -7.21  
(17.41) (17.27) (17.36) (17.40) (17.64) 
Observations 384 384 384 384 384 
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.5 shows the results of six regression analyses on state employment rate 
using total incentives and the five tax-based incentives as key independent variables. The 
results are similar to the previous results on unemployment rate. The finding shows that a 
1% increase in R&D tax credit is likely to increase the average employment rate by 
0.09%. This study suggests that tax incentives marginally impact the employment rate. 
Conversely, investment tax credits negatively impact the employment rate. Similar to the 
case of unemployment, this result could support the interpretation of economic policies as 
a zero-sum game because the total sum of the effect of tax-based incentives on 
employment status is close to zero. 
Based on the previous results, socioeconomic characteristics statistically influence 
the employment rate. Briefly, the results indicate that median housing value, poverty rate, 
and share of population over 65 negatively affect the unemployment rate. Contrarily, 
share of population under age 5 and owner-occupied housing positively influence the 
employment rate. 
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Table 5.5 Panel regression results: The effects of each tax incentives on employment rate 
 
 Employment Rate 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Incentives t-1 -0.00      
 (0.00)      
Job Creation Tax Credit t-1  0.01 
    
 
 (0.01) 
    
Investment Tax Credit t-1  
 
-0.02** 
   
 
 
 
(0.01) 
   
R&D Credit t-1  
  
0.09*** 
  
 
 
  
(0.03) 
  
Property Tax Abatement t-1  
   
-0.00 
 
 
 
   
(0.01) 
 
Customized Job Training Subsidy t-1  
    
-0.04 
 
 
    
(0.05) 
Poverty rate t-1 -0.54*** -0.53*** -0.54*** -0.52*** -0.54*** -0.54***  
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
% of Owner Occupied Housing t-1 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.31***  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Housing Value (log) t-1 -1.57*** -1.55*** -1.58*** -1.50*** -1.55*** -1.57*** 
 
(0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.41) 
Population (log) t-1 0.11 0.31 -0.09 0.18 0.13 0.10  
(0.72) (0.71) (0.70) (0.69) (0.71) (0.71) 
% Under 5 t-1 0.39* 0.36* 0.44** 0.36* 0.39* 0.37* 
 
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) 
% Over 65 t-1 -0.74*** -0.76*** -0.73*** -0.77*** -0.74*** -0.76***  
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Median Income (log) t-1 0.96 1.00 1.28 1.31 0.94 0.78  
(1.70) (1.69) (1.68) (1.67) (1.70) (1.71) 
% BA or higher t-1 -0.13* -0.12* -0.14** -0.13* -0.13* -0.14** 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
% Edu Expenditure t-1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
% Infrastructure Expenditure t-1 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
% Welfare Expenditure t-1 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 61.23*** 58.11*** 62.11*** 57.23*** 60.98*** 63.48*** 
 
(18.02) (17.88) (17.70) (17.60) (17.88) (18.14) 
Observations 384 384 384 384 384 384 
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.4 Conclusion 
While many studies argue that tax incentives have a negligible impact on local 
economies, tax incentives have long played a role in economic development policy in the 
United States and continue to be a popular policy tool used by state and local 
governments. The recent competition to attract Amazon’s second headquarters reveals 
governments are willing to offer billions of dollars in tax breaks and other subsidies to 
attract such corporations. The designation of opportunity zones in low-income 
neighborhoods is in line with tax-based incentives policy because they offer preferential 
tax treatment to investors. Despite the popularity of tax incentives, it is not yet known if 
these incentives are effective.  
To the best of my knowledge, only a few national studies have been conducted on 
this question. Using new data on nationwide tax incentives, this study examined the 
employment effects of tax incentives across the United States over time, providing more 
nuanced understandings on the effects of tax incentives overall. The results of this study 
show that tax incentives in general have no impact on employment, contradicting the 
theory that offering tax incentives to firms will lead to job growth. However, the findings 
support tax-based incentives as one of the popular economic development policies being 
a zero-sum game. Results of this study could explain the opposing ideas of previous 
studies on the effectiveness of tax-based incentives. It is likely that the previous studies 
have analyzed only the zero-sum nature of costs and benefits. Therefore, this study 
contributes to understanding the characteristics of different economic development 
policies. 
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CHAPTER 6. POLICY IMPLICATION AND LIMITATION OF DISSERTATION 
The essays in this dissertation focus on economic development policies in the US and 
offers unique contributions to the literature. First, by comprehensively reviewing extant 
studies, the first essay provides a nuanced understanding of economic development 
policies by using TIF. Specifically, policy makers in local government could quickly 
notice the current situation of economic development policies and TIF. This is an 
essential process before local government officials consider or implement economic 
development policies because many governments recently tend to adopt competitive 
development policies without adequate considerations. In this regard, the first chapter 
helps give policy makers an opportunity to know related issues, such as policy 
effectiveness. This part of TIF, which is highlighted, enables readers to comprehend the 
history, mechanism, and recent studies on TIF. This would help policy makers establish 
policy.  
When policy makers in local governments consider economic development 
policies, the first consideration may be the effectiveness policies. The second chapter 
theoretically gives a foundation about the characteristics of policies. Based on TIF 
policies, this chapter concludes that TIF programs have necessarily become a zero-sum 
game. This feature offers meaningful implications to policy makers. For example, 
adopting a new development policy in a specific area could be beneficial for the 
corresponding district. However, if policy makers would look at their communities as a 
whole, they could realize that doing so would not be as beneficial as they expected. This 
theoretical background will help policy makers assume a cautious attitude toward 
economic development policies. In other words, this chapter could call attention to 
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potential problems of unorganized development policies. Additionally, upper government 
levels, such as state, could have justification for intervening in uncontrolled economic 
development policies of local governments.    
In the third chapter, this dissertation narrows the range of the research subject to 
analyze the diffusion mechanism of economic development policies. Generally, 
competition among local governments may lead to introducing competitive new polices. 
However, we do not know exactly how the extent of competition among municipalities 
impacts the utilization of business incentives. This chapter helps find the significant link 
between competition and economic development policies. Thus, this chapter enables us 
to logically understand one of the diffusion mechanisms of development policies. 
Second, this chapter compares mayor–council and council–manager systems in terms of 
their adoption and extent of use of business incentives. Council–manager system tend to 
considerably constrain the adoption and extent use of incentives. This result could 
provide policy makers with meaningful implications because only a few studies analyze 
how economic development polices can be effectively constrained. This chapter gives a 
reasonable answer and serves as basis for future studies. Additionally, the result could 
give adequate justification for local government reform from mayor–council to council–
manager systems.  
The fourth chapter focuses on the state government to analyze the determinant of 
business incentives. One of the strengths of this chapter is that this analysis is based on 
comprehensive data. Most previous studies mainly focus on specific areas, not the 
national level. Consequently, it is difficult to generalize the result and find meaningful 
implications for related fields. In contrast, the study data cover most parts of US 
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utilization of business incentives. Based on this unique data set, this chapter reveals the 
importance of politics for economic development policies. The relationship between 
politics and development policies is vague, and the causality between politics and 
incentives is unknown. This chapter helps reveal such relationship, specifically how 
political ideology differently affects each business incentive. This result could also give a 
blanket answer for constraining unnecessary incentives. The exclusion of politics from 
development policies could alleviate the reckless use of business incentives. In this sense, 
this would be a valuable implication for policy makers.  
Lastly, the fifth chapter holds further significance because it provides valuable 
evidence of the effectiveness of policy in this field by using comprehensive data. 
Although we theoretically anticipate the characteristics of development policies, there is 
no clear empirical evidence supporting the zero-sum mechanism of such policies. Based 
on the employment and unemployment rates of most states, we confirm that the effect of 
business incentives is negligible. This result may persuade policy makers to reconsider 
overall economic development policies and could become a strong empirical 
counterargument to supporters of economic development policies.   
Although this dissertation is aimed at contributing to the current literature by 
overcoming previous limitations, a few limitations may be suggested. First, the problem 
of endogeneity could arise. Specifically, causality from government structure to 
economic development policy decisions can be influenced by causality by the other way. 
This possibility would require a change of the form of government, which sometimes 
occurs, mostly moving toward the council-manager form, which is the direction the 
dissertation recommends. However, the changes of the form of government are slow and 
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infrequent because the requirements to change are strict, unlike elections. Additionally, 
using only cities that actually changed would reduce the data set too much. In this sense, 
this study assumes that the government structure has long been fixed. It is less likely to 
be endogenous if the form has long been fixed.  
Second, there is a possibility that this study has omitted variable bias although it 
tries to include all relevant variables. For example, omitted variables concerning a local 
government’s financial condition could bias the estimated effect of the form of 
government if the financial conditions are related to the form of government. There is 
another possibility that municipalities managed better, in general, tend to choose to have 
a council-manager system. This possibility would, however, be consistent with the point 
of the dissertation that the council-manager system is likely to have better financial 
prospects than the mayor-council system.  
This study is concerned mainly with state policy, which is important because only 
a few studies have focused on the state level in economic development policies. Although 
chapter three deals with the local government level in economic development policies, it 
does not analyze the overall effect of economic development policy at the local 
government level. It is an undeniable fact that local policy can be very influential in 
economic development policies, such as TIF matters. In other words, theoretically, it is 
desirable to consider state policy and local policy at the same time. However, considering 
the conditions given, the data requirements to obtain an equivalent amount of information 
are much higher. This fact suggests a future study direction that would be a valuable 
addition to the study of the topic. 
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